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Ed.-Just prior to publication, the Virginia Supreme Court decided two of the Virginia
cases discussed in Section IV of this article. A discussion of the court's decision is in-
cluded in the Addendum.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem begins simply enough. Soon moving to another city
a homeowner negotiates and signs a contract for the sale of his
present home.1 The contract provides that the purchasers are to
assume the current mortgage with an interest rate of 91 %.2 The
vendor and the purchasers notify the lender of the intended sale.
Despite the fact that the proposed purchasers qualify as acceptable
credit-risks,3 the lender informs the parties that the current mort-
gage contains a "due-on-sale" clause and that he intends to accel-
erate the due date of the mortgage4 unless the purchasers agree to
1. The case touches many Americans, for it involves the common experience of purchas-
ing a home .... It is from that common experience that the present case evolves.
The facts are influenced by another common exprience of less ancient lineage,
namely, persistent, consistently high, rates of inflation, accompanied by increased in-
terest rates.
Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 912 (4th Cir. 1981).
Of the 75 million homes across America, more than 64% are owned by the people
who live in them, the largest percentage of owner-occupied housing in the world.
Owning a home, long a part of the American dream, today is a realistic goal-if not a
reality-for most of the people in this country.
FEDERAL NAT'L MORTGAGE ASS'N, PUB. No. 64 8/80, FANNIE MAE, AMERICA'S MORTGAGE RE-
SOURCE 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FNMA or FANNIE MAE].
2. The hypothetical presented in the text is representative of a situation which, with mi-
nor variations, has occurred countless times in the last few years. See generally Bartke &
Tagaropulos, Michigan's Looking Glass World of Due-on-Sale Clauses, 24 WAYNE L. REv.
971 (1978).
Most of the 75 million homes across America were purchased through mortgage loans. "In
1959 the outstanding home mortgage loans in the United States totaled $147 billion. By
1980 they had grown to more than one trillion dollars." FNMA, supra note 1, at 2.
3. Lenders, when underwriting a loan, use as a rule of thumb one-fourth of the gross
monthly income or one-third of the net income of the prospective borrower.
4. Although the mortgage actually serves only as security for the note, one or both of
these documents may contain a clause requiring the lender's approval of any transfer of the
secured property. Throughout this article, the term "mortgage" will be used to represent
both note and mortgage since the terms of the note are most often incorporated in the
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accept an increase in the interest rate from 9 % to 15%. The
purchasers, their enthusiasm now substantially chilled since this
would result in a substantial increase in their monthly payments,5
inform the vendor that they are either unwilling or unable to close
the deal.' The vendor, fearing a repeat of this experience or at
least a substantial wait to find a buyer wanting to refinance by a
new mortgage, must either pay points to the lender to reduce the
interest rate to his proposed purchaser or reduce the purchase
price to make the deal attractive to the purchaser.7 Either way the
vendor loses a substantial amount of the equity which he has built
up in his home, equity which will be needed for the down payment
on the home he intends to purchase in his new city.8 The purchas-
ers also are faced with the problem that the home of their dreams
may no longer be within financial reach.9
A clause originally designed as a shield to protect the lender
from the unacceptable credit-risk transferee has now become a
mortgage. "Mortgage" shall also be used interchangeably with "deed of trust."
5. On an original $60,000 loan for 30 years at 93 %, the monthly payment the borrower is
required to make increases from $493.80 to $718.62 per month as the interest rate is in-
creased from 93/ % to 15% at the end of the fifth year of the original 30-year term.
6. The amount of debt service (monthly payment composed of interest and amortization
- the principal necessary to reduce the balance to zero by the end of the mortgage term) is
derived from the balance of four factors:
1. Method of amortization
2. Interest
3. Length of mortgage
4. Loan-to-value ratio.
To date, most home loans are on level-payment amortization (the borrower pays the same
amount each month during the term of the loan). Therefore, the other three factors have
received the most attention, with interest being the most commonly understood. As interest
increases so does the amount of monthly payment. Therefore, to prevent an increase in his
monthly payment, the borrower must either (1) reduce the lQan-to-value ratio (percentage
borrowed of the appraised value) by making an increased down payment or (2) increase the
term of the loan period. In times of rapid inflation the prospective purchaser/borrower may
not be able to accumulate in savings the necessary funds for an increased down payment,
nor are lenders (borrowing short and lending long) agreeable to locking themselves into a
specified rate for long periods of time. The result is that the prospective purchaser is unable
to make the purchase unless the seller reduces the purchase price. See A. AXELROD, C. BER-
GER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 100-56 (2d ed. 1978).
7. Id.
8. During periods of extreme inflation, the vendor will not only be faced with higher home
prices but will need either a substantial down payment or a substantially increased monthly
payment over that of his previous home, even if both homes are the same price.
9. See generally A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 6.
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sword in the lender's hand to extract assumption fees and a higher
yielding interest rate in exchange for waiving acceleration of the
loan. 10
The lender should not be pictured as the villian through all of
this, however. Lenders, like vendors and purchasers, have been
caught in the unprecedented inflationary spiral. Lenders must pay
higher interest rates on deposits to remain competitive for inves-
tors' funds; they can not survive with revenues derived princi-
pally from low yielding long-term mortgages. 12
Furthermore, lenders seeking to obtain new funds from the sale
of mortgages in the secondary mortgage market are forced to ac-
cept increasing discounts on low yield mortgages.'3 Protection of
their loan portfolio has become a primary concern. 14 It may be,
however, that lenders have sought to protect their interest in the
wrong way.15 It has been suggested that lenders should use the
newer variable rate mortgages or other alternative mortgage de-
vices.'" At the very least, a lender must provide the borrowers with
10. See Nussbaum & Stein, Due-on-Sale Clauses Split the Courts, Nat'l L.J. Oct. 20,
1980 at 17, col. 1. See also Matis, Due on Sale Clause, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, MORT-
GAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS 408 (Feb.-Apr. 1981):
The traditional purpose has been to protect what is seen as a lender's underwriting
considerations such as the credit-worthiness of the borrower to repay the loan or,
even if no personal liability is involved, to meet monthly debt service payments and
other expenses of operating the security in a first-class manner, whether or not there
is sufficient cash flow from the property. Other considerations are the management
capabilities and the character of the borrower. The clause has been looked at as giv-
ing the lender an opportunity to make new underwriting decisions and either re-
jecting an unacceptable transferee or attempting to effect changes in the terms of the
loan in consideration of accepting a new "borrower."
11. See Bartke & Tagaropulos, supra note 2, at 974-79.
12. Lenders make their profit from the point spread on money borrowed as opposed to
money loaned. Deposits are received on which interest is paid to the depositor. The same
money is then loaned at a higher rate of interest. When deposits are inadequate to meet
borrowers' demands for loans, the lender sells a package of mortgages to secondary mort-
gage market purchasers and then lends the funds obtained from such sales at a higher yield.
13. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
14. See Matis, supra note 10, at 408.
15. Suggestions for proper use of the due-on-sale clause may be found in O'Connell, The
Due-on-Sale Clause in Florida: A Potential Battleground for Borrowers and Lenders, 31 U.
FLA. L. REV. 933, 967 (1979).
16. 14 THE MORTGAGE & REAL ESTATE EXEcUTIvE REP. 10 at 4 (1981); see also Browne,
Alternative Mortgage Instruments, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE
MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS 437 (Feb.-Apr. 1981); Comment, The Due-on-Sale Clause in Cali-
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notice of its intention to accelerate because of rising interest rates,
rather than impairment of the lender's security, 17 as the borrower
believed when he contracted with the lender for the loan.18
A due-on-sale clause is a form of acceleration clause.19 The in-
tended effect is to allow the lender to accelerate the due date of
the indebtedness secured by the mortgage and to foreclose the
mortgage upon a conveyance of the mortgaged property without
the consent of the lender.2 °
The expression of the clause itself, however, may take several
forms, and the event which triggers acceleration may be one or
more transfers. The clause may be expressed as either a positive or
negative covenant in the mortgage,"' the breach of which consti-
tutes default; or it may be expressed as specified default to make a
transfer without the lender's consent.22 Acceleration may be auto-
matic or at the lender's option, and his consent may be condi-
tioned on certain requirements which include: satisfaction of
credit-worthiness or managerial ability of the transferee; increase
in interest rate; partial prepayment; and payment of an assump-
fornia: A Case for Automatic Enforcement by the Private Lender, 13 U.S.F.L. REv. 639,
652-56 (1979).
17. In First S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977), the
Alabama court refused to allow the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause when the clause
gave no indication that the financial interest of the lender could be the sole basis for exercis-
ing the clause and the proposed sale caused no risk to the lender's security. See O'Connell,
supra note 15, at 945, 950.
18. 345 So. 2d at 303-04; see O'Connell, supra note 15, at 950 n.164.
19. The acceleration clause has long been used to permit the lender to accelerate the due
date and to declare default of the entire indebtedness upon the default in payment of any
installment, thus avoiding the burdensome and expensive necessity of suit on each install-
ment as it becomes due. A typical clause reads:
If any monthly installment under this Note is not paid when due and remains unpaid
after a date specified by a notice to Borrower, the entire principal amount outstand-
ing and accrued interest thereon shall at once become due and payable at the option
of the Note holder .... The Note holder may exercise this option to accelerate dur-
ing any default by Borrower regardless of any prior forbearance.
MFA 1-4 FAMILY UNIFORM NOTE INsTRuMENT, FORM 140 (Mar. 1977), reprinted in A. AxEL-
ROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 1143.
20. Matis, supra note 10, at 407.
21. The following is an example of'a standard "covenant" due-on-sale clause: "Mortgagor
will not sell, lease, convey, assign, further mortgage or otherwise transfer or encumber the
premises, or any portion thereof, or enter into an agreement for any of the foregoing, with-
out mortgagee's prior written consent." Id. at 408.
22. Id.
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tion fee. 23 The most common example of a "due-on" clause is
found in the boilerplate provision of paragraph 17 of the uniform
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)IFederal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) form.'
Conveyances which may trigger a due-on clause are not only an
outright sale but also a lease, second mortgage,25 contract for sale,
transfer of partnership or stock interests, transfer of management
responsibilities, transfer of any beneficial interests2 6 such as from
one spouse to another upon divorce, 27 from one co-tenant to an-
other, or the creation of an easement.2 8
23. Id. at 407.
24. Paragraph 17 of the FNMAIFHLMC Uniform Mortgage Instrument provides:
Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all or any part of the Property or an interest
therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent,
excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to this Mortgage, (b)
the creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances, (c) a
transfer by devise, descent or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant or
(d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option
to purchase, Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums secured by this
Mortgage to be immediately due and payable. Lender shall have waived such option
to accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and the person to whom the
Property is to be sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit of
such person is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on the sums se-
cured by this Mortgage shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has
waived the option to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if Borrower's suc-
cessor in interest has executed a written assumption agreement accepted in writing
by Lender, Lender shall release Borrower from all obligations under this Mortgage
and the Note.
25. The acceleration clause which is triggered by further encumbrance of the mortgaged
property is often referred to as a "due-on-encumbrance" clause. For the purposes of this
article, the use of the term "due-on-sale" shall include "due-on-encumbrance" unless other-
wise indicated. See La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864-869, 489 P.2d
1113, 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849-851 (1971). See also Letter from Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney
General of Maryland (Nov. 21, 1980), reprinted in 5 NAT'L PROP. L. DIG. 67, 69 (1981).
In this regard, I agree with some of my critics that the Maryland Courts are less
likely to prevent the exercise of a due-on-sale clause; nevertheless, I continue to ad-
here to the view that, in Maryland, an institutional lender's attempt to accelerate a
residential mortgage under a due-on-encumbrance clause would be a violation of pub-
lic policy if the lender's actions are solely for purposes of maintaining or improving
its loan portfolio.
26. Matis, supra note 10, at 407; see FNMA/FHLMC T 17, supra note 24.
27. Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: A Victory for the Consumer?, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 275, 299 n.116 (1979).
28. The wording of most due-on-sale clauses, such as 1 17 of the FNMAIFHLMC Uni-
form Mortgage Instrument, supra note 24, is sufficiently broad to encompass almost any
transfer of interest one can imagine.
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Both prospective vendors and recent purchasers have challenged
the enforcement of the due-on-sale clause, spawning numerous and
divergent judicial precedents." The principal defenses raised
against enforcement of the clause by consumers have been along
two lines-either that the use of the clause results in an unlawful
restraint on alienation or that its enforcement is unequitable and
against public policy for unconscionability due to the inherent ine-
quality of the bargaining position between lender and consumer.30
The key issue in recent litigation, however, appears to remain
much the same regardless of the manner in which the arguments
are couched: is it reasonable for a lender to accelerate the loan
when its sole reason for doing so is to upgrade its loan portfolio? 1
In those jurisdictions where courts have favored its enforcement,
clever lawyers have sought financing methods to circumvent the
clause such as the installment sales contract,3 2 land trusts and
long-term lease. 4 This in turn has ushered in the second genera-
tion of due-on-sale clause cases which have sub-issues often more
difficult and ill-defined than the parent issues of reasonableness
and equitability of the restraint on alienation. The lawyer prepar-
ing either a challenge to, or a defense of, the due-on-sale clause
29. These precedents are discussed in Section III of this article.
30. See generally Bartke and Tagaropulos, supra note 2; Bonanno, Due on Sale and Pre-
payment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California in Times of Fluctuating Interest
Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 267 (1972); Dunn & Nowinski, En-
forcement of Due-on-Transfer Clauses: An Update, 16 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 291
(1981); Enforcement of Due-on-Transfer Clauses, Report of the Subcommittee on "Due-
on" Clauses of the Committee on Real Estate Financing, 13 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 891
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Report]; O'Connell, supra note 15; Note, supra
note 27; Comment, supra note 16.
31. [I]n lender-oriented jurisdictions, the courts summarily dismiss the plaintiff's argu-
ment by citing a mortgagee's interest in protecting its security, while in consumer-
oriented jurisdictions, the lender is forced to demonstrate that the new owner will be
a greater security risk, when in fact, the reason for the acceleration of the debt may
have had no relation to such a fear on the part of the lender.
Nussbaum & Stein, supra note 10, at 17, col. 1.
32. Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1974).
33. 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981).
34. More purchasers are currently taking leases with options to purchase; sometimes they
record a lien on the leasehold to avoid problems posed by bona fide purchasers without
notice of the leasehold. The FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Mortgage Instrument 1 17, supra
note 24, specifically exempts leases of three years or less which do not contain the option to
purchase.
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now must be aware of implications posed by federal preemption, 5
the Uniform Commercial Code,"6 commercial versus residential
borrower,3 7 institutional lender versus seller financed transaction, 8
and the possible antitrust challenges posed by the secondary mort-
gage market.3"
Two recent cases illustrate the difficulty the courts have had rec-
onciling competing interests of vendor, purchaser, and lender and
the subsequent polarization of states into pro-lender and pro-con-
sumer camps. In an opinion representing the so-called "automatic
exercise" of the due-on-sale clause the Nebraska Supreme Court
declared:
Not only are we convinced that a "due-on-sale" clause is not repug-
nant to public policy but, to the contrary, we recognize that, under
certain economic circumstances, they may favor the public interest
and, therefore, be supportive of public policy. On the one hand, the
assets of savings and loan associations are principally invested in
long-term mortgages, while, on the other hand, the funds necessary
to make such loans are obtained from short-term and demand sav-
ings accounts and certificates. As the cost of obtaining deposits rises,
the spread widens between what the association must pay for funds
by way of interest and what the association receives from borrowers.
Once the spread gets too great, the association will be unable to
meet the standards set by government regulations and will fail. The
potential failure of savings and loan associations and the loss of
their depositors' funds should be of no less a concern to the courts
than the inability of a property owner to transfer its mortgage at a
premium when selling its property. Balancing portfolio return with
cost of money is an important factor in the survival of lending as-
sociations. The "due-on-sale" clause is an important device in main-
taining that balance.40
Typical of judicial treatment in those jurisdictions which have
chosen to restrict the exercise of the due-on-sale clause is that of
35. See text accompanying notes 434-38 infra.
36. See O'Connell, supra note 15, at 953.
37. See text accompanying notes 379-81 infra.
38. See text accompanying notes 374-78 infra.
39. See text accompanying notes 450-57 infra.
40. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, -, 293 N.W.2d 843,
849 (1980).
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Wellenkamp v. Bank of America:
We . . . reject defendant's contention that the lender's interest in
maintaining its loan portfolio at current interest rates justifies the
restraint imposed by exercise of a due-on clause upon transfer of
title in an outright sale. Although we recognize that lenders face in-
creasing costs of doing business and must pay increasing amounts to
depositors for the use of their funds in making long-term real estate
loans as a result of inflation and a competitive money market, we
believe that exercise of the due-on clause to protect against this
kind of business risk would not further the purpose for which the
due-on clause was legitimately designed, namely to protect against
impairment to the lender's security that is shown to result from a
transfer of title. Economic risks such as those caused by an infla-
tionary economy are among the general risks inherent in every lend-
ing transaction. They are neither unforeseeable nor unforeseen.
Lenders who provide funds for long-term real estate loans should
and do, as a matter of business necessity, take into account their
projections of future economic conditions when they initially deter-
mine the rate of payment and the interest on these long-term
loans.
41
The purpose of this article is to identify and examine the influ-
encing considerations and the attachment of significance given to
them by the courts in the "due-on" cases. After a discussion of
recent litigation addressing the enforceability of the "due-on"
clauses in Virginia, a summarizing checklist will follow detailing
the factors which must be considered by the practitioner preparing
to draft or litigate the clause.
IH. REASONABLENESS OF RESTRAINT: FULL CIRCLE IN FOURTEEN
YEARS?
No jurisdiction has given the due-on-sale clause as much atten-
tion in the courts as has California. Early California cases form
much of the basis for opinions of the courts in lender-oriented
states, while the more recent California cases are reflected in the
judicial opinions of states taking a pro-consumer stance.
41. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379, 385 (1978).
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The seminal case of Coast Bank v. Minderhout4 2 hardly seems
the vehicle upon which much of the law concerning due-on-sale
clauses in the nation would have developed. Chief Justice Roger
Traynor's decision in that case principally determined whether an
equitable mortgage was created. 3 Only in the alternative did the
defendant argue that the equitable mortgage could not be given
effect because the due-on clause was an invalid restraint on aliena-
tion.44 After citing several examples of reasonable restraints on
alienation, the court ruled that the due-on clause was, in this case,
reasonable.45 Despite the seeming insignificance of this holding,
Coast Bank has been viewed as determinative of the validity of the
clause. As Professor Hetland writes:
The typical institutional trust deed will afford the lender the right
to insist on full payment in the event of sale of the property by the
trustor. When not used merely as a devise to obtain "prepayment"
penalties, which probably are not collectible anyway when the "pre-
payment" is at the lender's option as it is upon exercise of the
clause, the due-on-sale clause is a necessary protection for the
lender. As is true with fire insurers, the lender must be given a
choice of borrowers to guard against the moral risks, here usually
waste or poor credit which increase the likelihood of having to re-
take the property. In the past, the validity of the clause was ques-
tionable because of the possibility of its being a restraint on aliena-
tion or of its being an acceleration subject to reinstatement under
the Civil Code. Justice Traynor held it is not the former and implied
it is not the latter. Both seem clearly correct.46
Jones v. Sacramento Savings & Loan Association,47 decided three
42. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
43. Id. at -, 392 P.2d at 267, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
44. Id. at _, 392 P.2d at 267-68, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 507-08.
45. The examples include: spendthrift trusts, because of the settlor's interest in protect-
ing potentially improvident beneficiaries; a lease for a term of years because of the lessor's
interest in the personal character of the lessee; a life estate because of the interest of the
remainderman in the life tenant's character; a corporation restricting its shares because of
the interest of shareholders in the persons with whom they are in business; and an executory
land contract because of the vendor's interest in the upkeep of the property and the charac-
ter and integrity of the purchaser. Id. at -, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
46. Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the Law, 53
CAL. L. REv. 151, 170 (1965).
47. 248 Cal. App. 2d 522, 56 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1967).
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years later in the California Court of Appeal, affirmed without dis-
cussion the enforceability of the clause.
In 1969, two appellate decisions further expanded the rationale
for enforcement of the clause.48 The most notable of the two, Cher-
ry v. Home Savings & Loan Association,9 enlarged the rationale
for upholding exercise of the clause to include the lender's eco-
nomic risk in a time of rising interest rates.50
Two years later, however, when faced with upholding a due-on-
encumbrance clause, the California Supreme Court began to re-
strict the expansiveness of enforcement promulgated by the appel-
late courts. 1 In La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Association
the court distinguished the due-on-encumbrance provisions from
the due-on-sale provision both as to the loss of lender's security
interest and the maintenance of the lender's portfolio argument.52
In refusing to enforce the clause based on the lender's impairment
of his security argument, the court stated:
A sale of property usually divests the vendor of any interest in that
property, and involves the transfer of possession, with responsibility
for maintenance and upkeep, to the vendee. A junior encumbrance,
on the other hand, does not terminate the borrower's interests in the
48. Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. & Loan Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969);
Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969). In
Heilbaum, the court said:
The right to acceleration bears the same relation to justifiable interest as did the total
restraint on alienation upheld in Minderhout. A lender incurs certain administrative
costs in issuing a loan and setting up provision for its servicing. Those costs may
reasonably be spread differently in the lender's estimation, depending on the agreed-
upon term of the loan. Hence the lender has a justifiable interest in motivating an
intended long-term debtor to refrain from early payment of principal; that interest
extends to recovery, through a prepayment fee, of its net costs and loss of profit in-
curred by reason of early payment. We conclude that the terms complained of do not
necessarily constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The complaint does
not allege that the fees proposed to be exacted were so large as to have no reasonable
relation to the justifiable interests of the lender which we have mentioned. Perhaps a
fact question could have been presented as to whether in effect the restraint was
unreasonable.
Id. at -, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
49. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
50. Id. at -, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
51. La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1971).
52. Id. at -, 489 P.2d at 1123-24, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
property, and rarely involves a transfer of possession.5"
The court also distinguished the loss of interest argument:
A junior encumbrance on the other hand [as opposed to an outright
sale] often represents only a small fraction of the borrower's equity
in the property; it does not often provide the borrower with the
means to discharge the balance secured by the trust deed. Thus
under a due-on-encumbrance clause the borrower is exposed to a
detriment quite different than that involved in a sale. He is re-
strained from executing any junior encumbrance unless he is willing
to acceed [sic] to lender's demand for current interest rates not
merely upon the sum secured by the second lien, but also upon the
balance due under the first trust deed. .... 54
In its effort to distinguish between the junior mortgage and the
outright sale, the court appeared to strengthen the position of the
due-on-sale clause with the concluding dictum "that the lender
may insist upon the automatic performance of the due-on-sale
clause because such a provision is necessary to the lender's secur-
ity. 5 5 Despite this apparent endorsement of the due-on-sale
clause, the real significance of La Sala was its initiation of a judi-
cial reappraisal of automatic enforcement per se and the scrutiny
of the facts of individual cases to determine the reasonableness of
restraint.5 6
Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association,5" the next impor-
tant case in California, took the rationale of La Sala one step fur-
ther and refused to allow the exercise of a due-on-sale clause as
applied to an installment sales contract.
[Ilt is not only the justification for enforcing a particular restraint
which is relevant to the determination of whether such a restraint is
"reasonable" within the meaning of Coast Bank; we must also con-
sider the quantum of restraint- that is, the actual practical effect
upon alienation which would result from enforcement of the re-
53. Id. at _, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
54. Id. at _, 489 P.2d at 1123-24 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60 n.17.
55. Id. at ., 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
56. Id. at _, 489 P.2d at 1124, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
57. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
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straint. It is the relationship between these two factors which must
govern our consideration of the enforcement of a "due-on" clause in
particular circumstances: To the degree that enforcement of the
clause would result in an increased quantum of actual restraint on
alienation in a particular case, a greater justification for such en-
forcement from the standpoint of the lender's legitimate interests
will be required in order to warrant enforcement.58
While adopting this two-prong balancing test for reasonableness,
the Tucker court determined that the enforcement of such a clause
upon an installment sale would result in a considerable restraint
on alienation.59 The court, however, carefully distinguished an in-
stallment sales contract from an outright sale. In the latter in-
stance, automatic enforcement would result "in little if any re-
straint on alienation because the terms of the second sale usually
provide for full payment of the prior trust deed."60 On the other
hand, enforcement against an installment land contract would vir-
tually eliminate installment sales where the property was subject
to a deed of trust since the vendor normally receives a small down
payment and could not, therefore, discharge the balance."1 Al-
though the court recognized that there was a change of possession
under an installment sale where there usually is not when a junior
encumbrance is financed, it found "that whatever dangers of this
nature might be deemed to exist in the abstract, they do not jus-
tify the blanket restraint on alienation.
62
Significantly, the court, as it had done in the La Sala decision,
rejected the proposition that the lender's interest in maintaining
its loan portfolio is a legitimate reason for acceleration. 3 The court
58. Id. at _, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
59. Id. at _, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. In Tucker, the court stated:
We reject the suggestion that a lender's interest in maintaining its portfolio at cur-
rent interest rates justifies the restraint imposed by the exercise of a "due-on" clause
upon the execution of an installment land contract. Whatever cogency this argument
may retain concerning the relatively mild restraint involved in an outright sale (a
matter to which we do not now address ourselves), it lacks all force in the case of the
serious and extreme restraint which would result from the automatic enforcement of
"due-on" clauses in the context of installment land contracts.
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determined that the clause is not to be automatically enforced, but
enforced "only when the beneficiary-obligee [under the deed of
trust] can demonstrate a threat to one of his legitimate interests
sufficient to justify the restraint on alienation inherent in its en-
forcement. '8 4 The court, however, referred to automatic enforce-
ment on an outright sale as involving "little if any restraint. '65
The California court completed the circle with its decision in
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America." Considering the dicta of prior
cases, it was presumed that the California Supreme Court would
consider the assumption of a loan by a purchaser taking legal title
as an outright sale and permit the automatic enforcement of a due-
on-sale clause. 7 This was not to be. In a six to one decision, the
court ruled "that a due-on clause contained in a promissory note or
deed of trust cannot be enforced upon the occurrence of an out-
right sale unless the lender can demonstrate that enforcement is
reasonably necessary to protect against impairment of its security
or the risk of default." 8 The court further expressly disapproved
Hellbaum69 and Cherry"0 and overruled Coast Bank 1 to the extent
that Coast Bank was inconsistent with Wellenkamp.72
Id. at -, 526 P.2d at 1175 n.10, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638 n.10.
64. Id. at -, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639. The court also noted:
Such legitimate interests include not only that of preserving the security from waste
or depreciation but also that of guarding against what have been termed the "moral
risks" of having to resort to the security upon default. Thus, for example, if the bene-
ficiary can show that the party in possession under the installment land contract is,
or is likely to be, conducting himself with respect to the property in a manner which
will probably result in a significant wasting or other impairment of the security, he
may properly insist upon enforcement of the "due-on" clause. Similarly, if the benefi-
ciary can show that the prospects of default on the part of the vendor (requiring the
inconvenience of resort to the security) are significantly enhanced in the particular
situation, such circumstances might constitute a significant justification for enforce-
ment of the clause despite its restraining effect.
Id. at -, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at -, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
66. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
67. See, e.g., Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d at -, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116
Cal. Rptr. at 638.
68. 21 Cal. 3d at -, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
69. 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969).
70. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
71. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
72. 21 Cal. 3d at -, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
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Although the Wellenkamp court adopted an even broader defi-
nition of an outright sale than would have been expected from the
Tucker and La Sala dicta,7" the surprise from the court came when
it refused the conclusion that the restraint on alienation is slight in
an outright sale. 4 The court chose instead to determine the rea-
sonableness of the restraint by balancing the quantum of restraint
against the justification for the restraint advanced by the lender.
After a discussion of the general economic conditions of inflation
and tight money, the court concluded that enforcement of the due-
on-sale clause results in a clear restraint on alienation.7 5 Against
this restraint, the court then measured the justifying factors as
enunciated in Tucker.76 After reaffirming the Tucker ruling that a
restraint on alienation can be justified only upon impairment of
lender's security interest such as a threat of waste or the "moral
risks" of having to resort to the security upon default, the court
rejected the lender's argument that such a threat is present in an
outright sale:77
[W]e are now convinced that, although the original borrower/seller
no longer retains an interest in the property after transfer of legal
title in an outright sale involving no secondary financing by the
seller . . . this fact does not necessarily increase the risk to the
lender that waste or default will occur. Thus the buyer, in an out-
right sale, in order to pay off the seller's equity, may make a large
down payment on the property, thereby creating an equity interest
in the property in him which is sufficient to provide an adequate
incentive not to commit waste or permit the property to depreciate.
Moreover, the buyer in such an outright sale may be at least as
good, if not a better credit risk than the original borrower/seller. 78
The court also soundly rejected the premise that the lender's loan
portfolio needed to be maintained at the current interest rate, by
denying that this was one of the purposes for which due-on clauses
73. Id. at _, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
74. Id.
75. Id. at _, 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
76. Id. at _, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
77. Id.
78. Id. at _, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
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were legitimately designed. 9
In his dissent, Justice Clark argued that the majority either mis-
read or rejected Tucker-the very decision upon which it pur-
ported to rely so heavily. 0 The result of such error is a full circle
departure from the court's earlier interpretation in Coast Bank
and an obliteration of the prior distinction of an outright sale from
a junior encumbrance and an installment sales contract.8 1 Justice
Clark further concluded that the majority had inaccurately
weighed the relevant factors for justification of the restraint giving
a marketable bonus to the owner of encumbered real property and
penalizing the seller of unencumbered property.2
The Wellenkamp decision, however, was expressly limited to the
institutional lender, thus leaving open the question of enforceabil-
ity when a private lender is involved. Three appellate cases fol-
lowed, each discussing the distinction between private and institu-
tional lenders and then each deciding the case on other grounds. 8
In the first of these cases, Pas v. Hill," decided four months af-
ter Wellenkamp, Hill had sold the property to a partnership trad-
ing as Johnson House and sought to exercise the due-on-sale clause
contained in the deed of trust against Pas, the transferee of John-
son House. Pas instituted an action to enjoin this exercise. Johnson
House, after experiencing difficulty making payments under the
deed of trust, quitclaimed the property to Pas as security for the
repayment of a personal loan from Pas. This quitclaim became an
absolute conveyance upon Johnson House's inability to repay Pas.
Upon learning of the transfer, Hill demanded payment of the en-
tire unpaid balance. 5 While finding that the deed was intended as
a security interest rather than as an absolute conveyance at its in-
ception and was merely a junior encumbrance, the trial court nev-
ertheless determined that the transfer of title was sufficient to trig-
79. Id. at _, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
80. Id. at _, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (Clark, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at _, 582 P.2d at 977-78, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
82. Id. at _, 582 P.2d at 978-79, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88.
83. Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. Land Dynamics, 103 Cal. App. 3d 968, 163 Cal. Rptr.
348 (1980); Medovoi v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 3d 876, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572
(1979); Pas v. Hill, 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978).
84. 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978).
85. Id. at -, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
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ger the clause.8 6 The court also found, however, that the
defendant's security was not impaired and concluded that this was
an unlawful restraint on alienation.8
The appellate court upheld the trial court in light of the deci-
sions in La Sala, Tucker, and Wellenkamp,88 pointing out that
this was really an absolute conveyance rather than a junior encum-
brance which brought it under the ambit of HelIbaum, Cherry, and
Coast Bank. 9 The court noted that these cases had been either
disapproved or overruled by Wellenkamp,90 but that Wellenkamp
applied only to institutional lenders.9 1 The implication was that
these cases might still control the individual who lends purchase
money and takes back a deed of trust with a due-on-sale clause.
The court did not decide the case on this ground, however, and the
question remained unresolved.2
Two months later in Medovoi v. American Savings & Loan As-
sociation,9" the court held Wellenkamp inapplicable to situations
involving involuntary transfers94 and multi-family units or com-
mercial transactions.9 5 Implicit in this opinion, however, were mis-
givings about the Wellenkamp decision and a reluctance to apply
it if possible. 6 Thus, the court construed Wellenkamp to be lim-
ited to voluntary outright sales by an owner-occupier of a single-
family residence where the loan is made by an institutional
86. Id. at -, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
87. Id.
88. Id. at -, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03.
89. Id. at -, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
90. Id.
91. 87 Cal. App. 3d at -, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
92. The court noted that:
[T]he transaction between Johnson House and Pas in no way impaired Hill's secur-
ity.... The only justification given at trial by defendant Hill for wanting to exercise
the due-on-sale clause was that he "expected the property to be sold before the note
went full term, and ... wanted the cash to put into other investments." We con-
clude, therefore, that the trial court acted with propriety in enjoining defendants
from enforcing the due-on-sale clause on the basis of the transaction between John-
son House and Pas.
Id. at -, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
93. 89 Cal. App. 3d 876, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1979).
94. See text accompanying notes 305-32 infra.
95. See text accompanying notes 381-83 infra.
96. 89 Cal. App. 3d at -, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 580-83.
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lender.9 7 Severe criticism of Wellenkamp is expressed in footnote
one98 of the case in a concurring opinion by Justice Thompson. In
the footnote the court agreed with the Wellenkamp dissent that
the court had misread or rejected Tucker. Further it contended
that the Wellenkamp decision was an unnecessary governmental
intrusion into citizens' private lives by the judiciary and that if
this intrusion were to be permitted at all it should be done by the
legislature. Justice Thompson was reluctant to modify Justice
Traynor's opinion in Coast Bank relating to reasonable restraints
imposed to allow the lender to recapture profits caused by fluctua-
tions in the interest rates. He urged that these restraints are rea-
sonable because California competes in a national market and any
limitations which make California property less desirable will allow
limited funds to go to other more competitive states.100
The California Supreme Court denied the petition for rehearing
in Medovoi, but ordered decertification of the appellate opinion. 01
Nevertheless, the opinion remains on record and at best adds con-
fusion to the understanding of the effect of the due-on-sale clause
in California.
The third decision involving a due-on-sale clause in California
was that of Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. Land Dynamics.10 2
This case involved a chattel mortgage between private parties, not
an institutional lender. Although the court recognized that it had
the opportunity to resolve the questions implied in Wellenkamp
concerning the non-institutional lender's right to automatic en-
forcement of the clause, the court declined to do so because there
was no unreasonable restraint on alienation.103 Therefore, in its
97. Id. at _, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 580-81.
98. Id. at _, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
99. Id. at -, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84.
100. Id. at -, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
101. Note, supra note 27, at 303.
102. 103 Cal. App. 3d 968, 163 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1980).
103. The court stated:
[T]wo circumstances establish that in fact there was no unreasonable restraint on
alienation. First, by virtue of the outright sale ... [there] is no claim that [the bor-
rower] could not raise the $150,000 balance of the accelerated debt. Second, the wine
cooperage (the secured chattel) which is the major asset securing the debt is in its
nature subject to removal and to deterioration ....
Id. at -, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
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view, neither the Tucker test nor an extension of Wellenkamp was
needed.104
In the most recently reported decision'0 5 in California to con-
sider the due-on-sale clause, the Court of Appeal for the Second
District of California was faced with the applicability of Wel-
lenkamp to a non-institutional seller of commercial real property
who held a second deed of trust securing part of the purchase
price.10 6 After ruling that the defendants-vendors were non-institu-
tional lenders, the court determined that "where the facts and rea-
sons against allowing legal recognition discussed in Wellenkamp
are not present, the due-on clause has been recognized as, and con-
tinues to be, valid.'10 7 Emphasized were both the non-institutional
aspects of the lender and the investment and commercial nature of
the ten unit apartment building involved in the sale and deed of
trust.10 Under the facts the court deemed the "quantum of re-
104. "Because the affected property in Wellenkamp was realty, the [Wellenkamp] court
did not discuss possible extension of the new rule to chattels subjected to a security interest.
Here no institutional lender is involved and the major asset securing the obligation is per-
sonal property." Id. at -, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 354. The Guild court was also required to inter-
pret the contract because the due-on-sale clause appeared only in the chattel mortgage. The
court ruled:
There is no support in the documents comprising the contract for the conclusion that
the agreement merely placed a due-on-sale restraint on the separate sale of the coop-
erage without a sale of the realty. If it has any significance at all, the absence of the
due-on-sale clauses in the deed of trust and note implies only that the realty could be
sold separately, without actuating the acceleration clause, as long as the cooperage
was retained. But in fact the cooperage was not retained.
Id.
105. A case awaiting appeal to the California Supreme Court concerns the applicability of
the federal preemption doctrine to the enforcement of the due-on-sale clause by federally
chartered savings and loans. See L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 1981, § CC, Part 4, at 1, col. 3. See
also text accompanying notes 384-435 infra.
106. Dawn Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 439, 172 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1981).
107. Id. at -, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court also held that:
In view of the total lack of factual support for the conclusion that defendants...
were institutional lenders, the only other charitable view of the [trial] court's conduct
is that the court assumed that the rule of Wellenkamp is applicable to all due-on-sale
clauses, irrespective of the status of the lender. This is not the law. . . .Wellenkamp
did not make illegal or unenforceable acceleration clauses for all purposes and in any
and all situations.
Id. at _, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
108. "In Wellenkamp the security was a single-family, owner-occupied home. Here, the
...property at bench, as to all parties, is investment commercial property. In Wellenkamp
the court noted the added feature of the public policy favoring protection of equity in a
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straint" to be evenly balanced with the "justification for
enforcement.'1 0 9
III. OTHER DUE-ON CLAUSE CASES
Since the clause may be invoked in all jurisdictions if a threat of
waste or default is shown,110 what distinguishes jurisdictions as ei-
ther pro-lender or pro-consumer""' is the reason for enforce-
ment." '2 It must be emphasized at the outset that such classifica-
tions may be imprudent. Some cases have involved multiple
influencing factors."' Other cases have turned on unusual facts,1 4
while still other opinions favoring the lender have been expressly
limited to the specific facts of the case. 1" 5 It is also important to
stress the date of each case, keeping in mind the then prevailing
state of economy with its corresponding interest rates and
inflation.
Although not uniform in the rationale of their opinions, the
person's home." Id. at -, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
109. Id. at -, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
110. "By the same token, no court has decided that such clauses are immune from judi-
cial scrutiny or the usual equitable defenses ... " Bartke & Tagaropulos, supra note 2, at
985.
111. As Bartke and Tagaropulos noted, a word about nomenclature is necessary:
The literature on the subject uses the terms majority and minority rules. Considering
that ... [less than half] of the 50 states have had cases dealing with the phenome-
non, the term "majority rule" is something of a misnomer; ... [a] more descriptive
term, however, ranges the courts by their appreciation of the balance of public policy
considerations on the side of the lender or the borrower. For those jurisdictions which
are referred to generally as "the majority rule," therefore, the term "lender oriented
jurisdictions" is substituted. By the same token, rather than speaking about "minor-
ity jurisdictions," the term "consumer oriented jurisdictions" is used.
Id. at 985.
112. "What is really involved . . . is a question of pleading and burden of proof...
[T]he differences are of procedure rather than substance." Id. at 984-85.
113. See, e.g., Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 3d 875, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 572 (1979); Silver v. Rochester Say. Bank, 73 App. Div. 2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945
(1980).
114. See, e.g., Rayford v. Louisiana Say. Ass'n, 380 So. 2d 1232 (La. App. 1980) (transfer
between co-mortgagors); Fidelity Land Dev. Corp. v. Rieder & Sons Bldg. & Dev. Co., 151
N.J. Super. 502, 377 A.2d 691 (1977) (transfer of undeveloped land to president and princi-
pal stockholder of mortgagor).
115. See e.g., Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471
(Minn. 1981) (enforcement of due-on-sale clause is per se unreasonable as applied to resi-
dential homeowner, although enforcement was permitted as to investment property).
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states that can be considered lender oriented are: Alabama, Colo-
rado, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.116 States that can be considered
consumer oriented are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Lou-
isiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Washing-
ton.117 It would be unwise to categorize New York, Ohio, Utah,
116. ALABAMA: Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979); Tidwell v. Wittmeier,*150
Ala. 253, 43 So. 782 (1907); First S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1977).
COLORADO: Von Ehrenkrook v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 196 Colo. 179, 585
P.2d 589 (1978); Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240
(1973). Colorado is now considered pro-consumer for new mortgages. See COLo. REV. STAT. §
38-30-165 (Cum. Supp. 1980) infra note 134.
ILLINOIS: Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill.2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
MONTANA: Dobitz v. Oakland, 172 Mont. 126, 561 P.2d 441 (1977).
NEBRASKA: Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293
N.W.2d 843 (1980).
NEVADA: First Commercial Title Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976).
NEW JERSEY: Fidelity Land Dev. Corp. v. Rieder & Sons Bldg. & Dev. Co., 151 N.J.
Super. 502, 377 A.2d 691 (1977); Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J.
Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (1976); Poydan, Inc. v. Agia Kiriaki, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 141, 325
A.2d 838 (1974); Shalit v. Investors Say. & Loan Ass'n, 101 N.J. Super. 283, 244 A.2d 151
(1968).
NORTH CAROLINA: Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d
580 (1976).
TENNESSEE: Parker v. Covington, 614 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn. App. 1981); Gunther v.
White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
TEXAS: Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
117. ARIZONA: Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152
(1978); Lane v. Bisceglia, 15 Ariz. App. 269, 488 P.2d 474 (1971); Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v.
Harm, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), pet. for rev. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d
1113 (1972).
ARKANSAS: Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725
(1972).
CALIFORNIA: Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1978); Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974); La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113,
97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971); Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal.2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 505 (1964); Dawn Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 439, 172 Cal. Rptr. 142
(1981); Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. Land Dynamics, 103 Cal. App. 3d 968, 163 Cal. Rptr.
348 (1980); Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 3d 876, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572
(1979); Pas v. Hill, 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978); Cherry v. Home Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969); Hellbaum v. Lytton Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969); Jones v. Sacramento Say. & Loan Ass'n,
248 Cal. App. 2d 522, 56 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1967).
FLORIDA: Woodcrest Apartments Ltd. v. IPA Realty Partners Richardson Palmer, 3rd
Inv. KG, 397 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Chopan v. Klinkman, 330 So. 2d 154
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Wisconsin and Wyoming as either pro-lender or pro-consumer. 11s
A. Pro-lender Jurisdictions
Two cases frequently cited for authority in later opinions were
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Stockman v. Burke, 305 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1974); Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. English, 249 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1971); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
LOUISIANA: Rayford v. Louisiana Say. Ass'n, 380 So. 2d 1232 (La. Ct. App 1980).
MICHIGAN: Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250
N.W.2d 804 (1977); Lemon v. Nicolai, 33 Mich. App. 646, 190 N.W.2d 549 (1971); Pellerito
v. Weber, 22 Mich. App. 242, 177 N.W.2d 236 (1970).
MINNESOTA: Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471
(Minn. 1981).
MISSISSIPPI: Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975).
OKLAHOMA: Continental Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
WASHINGTON: Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437,
553 P.2d 1090 (1976); Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545
P.2d 546 (1976); Terry v. Born, 24 Wash. App. 652, 604 P.2d 504 (1979).
Seventeen states are now considered pro-consumer by FNMA. They are: Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Washington. In these states,
FNMA requires the inclusion of a seven year call option for mortgages purchased on or after
November 10, 1980. The call option permits FNMA to call loans due and payable-in-full
seven years after the date of origination. FNMA NEws RELEASE No. 4327 (Jan. 5, 1981).
In these [seventeen states], FNMA legal counsel has determined that state law or
court decisions limit full enforcement of standard due-on-sale mortgage provisions,
under which lenders can evaluate the credit-worthiness of the proposed new borrower
and increase the mortgage interest rate if market interest rates have increased since
the loan was made.
... In all states, the due-on-sale provision in new conventional mortgages will be
enforced to the extent permissible.
Id. "FNMA noted that a due-on-sale provision has been a part of its conventional mortgage
documents for a number of years, but that until now the corporation had chosen not to
enforce it." FNMA NEWS RELEASE No. 4286 (Oct. 23, 1980).
118. NEW YORK: Silver v. Rochester Sav. Bank, 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1980);
Nichols v. Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1978); Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust
v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d 583 (1977); Rogers v. Williamsburgh
Say. Bank, 79 Misc. 2d 852, 361 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1974); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63
Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1970); Blomgren v. Tinton, 33 Misc. 2d 1057, 225 N.Y.S.2d
347 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
OHIO: Great N. Sav. Co. v. Ingarra, No. 9433 (Ohio 9th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1980);
Peoples Sav. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970).
UTAH: Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 26 Utah 2d 383, 490 P.2d 328 (1971).
WISCONSIN: Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531,
239 N.W.2d 20 (1976); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs., Inc., 66
Wis. 2d 210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire
Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973).
WYOMING: Young v. Hawks, 624 P.2d 235 (Wyo. 1981).
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decided in 1973-Gunther v. White119 in Tennessee and Malouff v.
Midland Federal Savings & Loan Association 20 in Colorado. Both
cases involved assumptions upon outright sale and both allowed
the lender to accelerate the due-on-sale clause based solely on the
lender's need to increase the interest rate. In Gunther, the Tennes-
see court held that the exercise of the clause did not constitute an
unreasonable restraint on alienation,121 did not violate the right to
contract,'22 and was not unconscionable. 23 The real issue accord-
ing to the court was whether the exercise of the option to acceler-
ate in order to "secure an increase in the rate of interest"' 24 is
valid. Quoting extensively from Cherry, 25 the court held that such
an exercise was valid. 2 '
The Gunther opinion was recently affirmed in Parker v. Coving-
ton.127 The court rejected the seller's argument that Gunther was
distinguishable because the purchasers were already paying a
higher interest rate. They had taken a wrap-around mortgage from
the sellers and were not assuming the mortgage at the existing
rate. Again, the lender's admitted motive was to increase the inter-
est rate, and the court noted: "[N]or is it reasonable to put the
burden upon a contracting party [lender] to show that the chal-
lenged provision was economically necessary. "128
The Colorado court in Malouff also relied on Cherry 2 and
Coast Bank130 in allowing the lender to increase the interest rate
by one percent. The court quoted from an affidavit of the executive
vice president of the lender:
The two primary ways that [the lender] may make interest rate ad-
justments essential for it to protect its depositors against inflation
119. 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
120. 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
121. 489 SAV.2d at 530.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 531.
124. Id. at 530.
125. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
126. 489 S.W.2d at 531.
127. 614 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn. App. 1981).
128. Id. at 812.
129. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969).
130. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
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are by making variable interest rate loans or by employing a 'due-
on-sale' clause to adjust interest rates on assumptions of existing
loans when circumstances warrant an adjustment.'31
In 1978 the Colorado Supreme Court was again asked to ex-
amine the validity of a due-on-sale clause when the lender sought
an increase in the interest rate from 5 % to 9 % per annum.13 2
The purchasers claimed that a Colorado statute'33 enacted shortly
after the Malouff decision made any increase in interest rate of
more than 1% illegal. The court ruled that the purchasers' reliance
upon the statute was misplaced in that the statute prohibited in-
creases above 1% of mortgage instruments executed after July 1,
1975, the effective date of the statute, rather than mortgages as-
sumed after that date.134 The contention of the purchasers that the
increase in interest rate was an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion was dismissed as the issue was not properly raised in the lower
court.
3 5
131. 181 Colo. at __, 509 P.2d at 1244-45.
132. Von Ehrenkrook v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 196 Colo. 179, -, 585 P.2d 589,
590 (1978).
133. The statute at issue in Von Ehrenkrook provides, inter alia, that:
Unreasonable restraint on the alienation of property-prohibited practices. (1)
Subject to the limitations and exceptions as provided in this section, any person with
a security interest in real estate shall not, directly or indirectly:
(b) Increase the interest rate more than one percent per annum above the existing
interest rate of the indebtedness or otherwise modify, for the benefit of the holder of
the security interest, the terms and conditions of the indebtedness secured by such
real estate, on account of the sale or transfer of such real estate or on account of the
assumption of such indebtedness; or
(d) Enforce or attempt to enforce the provisions of any mortgage, deed of trust, or
other real estate security instrument executed on or after July 1, 1975, which provi-
sions are contrary to this section; but this section shall not be applicable to instru-
ments executed prior to July 1, 1975, nor to the rights, duties, or interests flowing
therefrom.
COLo. REV. STAT. § 38-30-165 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
134. 196 Colo. at -, 585 P.2d at 590.
135. The Von Ehrenkrook court stated:
In Malouff we held that an increase of the interest rate on an assumed note of 1%
was not an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of real property. In reaching that
decision we considered many factors including the current market rate of interest.
Clearly Malouff does not stand for the proposition that prior to the enactment of
section 38-30-165(1)(b), any increase over 1% would always be illegal or that a 1%
increase would always be legal. Thus section 38-30-165(1)(b) is not expository of the
DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE
In a 1975 case involving a land-sale contract, the Illinois Su-
preme Court decided that a 1% increase in the interest rate was
not an unreasonable restraint on alienation. 138 The court did not
address the issue of increasing the interest rate to protect the
lender's loan portfolio. Instead, the court spoke of protecting the
security interest of the lender based upon "the appraisal of the
personal integrity of the borrower.' 13 7 The exact meaning of this
case is unclear in that there was no showing of a threat to the se-
curity or of default.
Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,3 " de-
cided by the North Carolina Supreme Court, has become a stan-
dard in the arsenal of cases rolled out in every lender's brief since
1976. The case involved an assumption which triggered the clause.
There was no evidence that the security was impaired, so the case
revolved solely on the lender's desire to increase the interest rate
from 7% to 9/4 %.9 Viewing the line of cases classified as pro-
consumer as "too restrictive in [their] approach,' 140 the court ruled
that the practical effect on alienation was insignificant and
speculative.
The court was troubled by the "double risk" to the lender in
that the mortgage instrument provided borrower the right of pre-
payment without penalty. This would surely occur through the
borrower refinancing when interest rates decreased; yet if the rates
increase the lender would be denied the same right.'4 In a strong
dissent, however, it was urged that the mortgage note was an adhe-
sion contract, cloaking the effect of its terms in seemingly innocu-
ous clauses. 42
Similarly, the New Jersey Superior Court has upheld the use of
preexisting law. The legislature realized this fact by the provisions it included in par-
agraph (1)(d).
Id. at -, 585 P.2d at 591.
136. 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
137. Id. at -, 333 N.E.2d at 4.
138. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
139. Id. at , 224 S.E.2d at 582.
140. Id. at _, 224 S.E.2d at 587.
141. Id. at _, 224 S.E.2d at 585.
142. Id. at _, 224 S.E.2d at 589 (Lake, J., dissenting).
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the clause to secure an increase in interest rates.143 The court's po-
sition was that a lending institution has a fiduciary duty to the
depositors "to obtain the best lawful yield of [its] mortgage portfo-
lio."'144 "Calling a loan in order to get the full benefit of current
interest rates is a legitimate and reasonable business practice-one
which protects the association members and their savings invest-
ments as well as fulfilling the statutory purpose of the
association. '145
Although this case involved a land sale contract which the court
perceived as a "change in ownership, 146 one year later the same
court decided in Fidelity Land Development Corp. v. Rieder &
Sons Building & Development Co. 147 that a "mere paper transfer
of title, without any accompanying jeopardy to plaintiff's security,"
did not trigger the clause. 14 In Fidelity, the corporate mortgagor
had transferred undeveloped land to its president and principal
stockholder.
The Fidelity court relied strongly on the Nevada case of First
Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes,1 49 which had observed:
We do not suggest that the clause is absolutely enforceable with-
out regard to surrounding circumstances. We would merely attach
the same reverence to the due-on-sale clause as is accorded to any
other provision which may appear in a contract.
Although enforceability of the clause is automatic, it is not abso-
lute and may be vulnerable to certain defenses (i.e., waiver).1 50
Nevada, however, must be considered a pro-lender jurisdiction
since the Holmes court upheld the clause's enforcement on free-
dom of contract principles.1 51 Further, the court raised the impor-
tant procedural point of who should bear the burden of showing
143. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558
(1976).
144. Id. at _, 364 A.2d at 562.
145. Id. at _, 364 A.2d at 561.
146. Id. at _, 364 A.2d at 562.
147. 151 N.J. Super. 502, 377 A.2d 691 (1977).
148. Id. at -, 377 A.2d at 695.
149. 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976).
150. 151 N.J. Super. at -, 377 A.2d at 694 (citing 92 Nev. at -, 550 P.2d at 1272).
151. 92 Nev. at -, 550 P.2d at 1271-72.
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the reasonableness of the restraint.152
With its recent decision of Tierce v. APS Co.,153 the Alabama
court overruled the 1977 intermediate appellate decision which
formed the basis for its previous characterization as a pro-con-
sumer jurisdiction. In its 1977 decision, First Southern Federal
Savings & Loan Association v. Britton,15 4 the appellate court had
ruled that while a due-on-sale clause is valid to protect the security
interests of the lender, the clause may not be used to extract
higher interest rates.155 The rationale for the decision was that a
clause to obtain higher interest rates may be contracted for, but
"such purpose may not be hidden behind a clause which is as-
sumed to only provide protection for the security. 156
Tierce held that the use of the clause to obtain higher interest
rates is a "valid business purpose, ' 157 that Britton was not the ma-
jority rule in the United States,1 58 and that the court was per-
suaded by the rationale of the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision
in Gunther v. White.159 Chief Justice Torbert filed a dissent on the
denial of the application for rehearing. He concluded that the logic
of Britton was correct-that the lender can demand a higher inter-
est rate with use of a specific clause for that purpose, but not with
the due-on-sale clause.160 He contended that the majority "has re-
written the agreement between the parties in the instant case and
the meaning of the 'due-on-sale' clause in many other existing
agreements."' 16 1 It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Tor-
bert's dissent was filed on the denial of the application for rehear-
ing; he voted with the majority on the first appeal.
152. The court stated that the mortgagor has the burden of showing that the enforcement
of the clause is unreasonable. "A lender has the right to be assured in his mind of the safety
of his security without the burden of showing at each transfer that his security is being
impaired." Id. at -, 550 P.2d at 1272.
153. 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979).
154. 345 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
155. "The purpose of the clause was not being served by the threatened acceleration but
the unrelated financial interest of the lender was the reason for the acceleration." Id. at 303.
156. Id. at 303-04.
157. 382 So. 2d at 487-88.
158. Id. at 487.
159. 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
160. 382 So. 2d at 490 (Torbert, C.J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 488.
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The Montana Supreme Court has also been presented with the
question of whether a due-on-sale clause was an invalid restraint
on alienation in a 1977 case, Dobitz v. Oakland.16 2 The court held
in the negative, noting "the difference between a conveyance and a
contract to convey. "163
Nebraska, with its 1980 decision in Occidental Savings & Loan
Association v. Venco Partnership"" provides the strongest pro-
lender expression to date. After a detailed discussion of direct and
indirect restraints on alienation, the court concluded that enforce-
ment of the clause was neither.16 5 The court expressed its firm be-
lief that ability to enforce the due-on-sale clauses was essential to
the survival of lending associations. 6 '
Texas 67 has recently joined these pro-lender jurisdictions in an
appellate opinion which claimed that the "majority rule" permits
acceleration without proof of an impairment of security.6 ' The
court noted that the indirect nature of the restraint did not fit into
the usual classification of invalid restraints, e9 but added in dicta
that it would not permit "enforcement of acceleration clauses acti-
vated by the lender's fraudulent inequitable conduct."1 70
B. Pro-consumer Jurisdictions
As was stated earlier, the defenses raised by borrowers to en-
forcement of due-on-sale clauses generally fall into two categories:
(1) unreasonable restraint on alienation and (2) other equitable de-
fenses. The line of cases in California discussed in section II of this
article details the evolution of the restraint on alienation argu-
ment. Since the present status of the law in California fairly repre-
sents the pro-consumer point of view on restraint on alienation,
162. Dobitz v. Oakland, 172 Mont. 126, 561 P.2d 441 (1977).
163. Id. at -, 561 P.2d at 443.
164. 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
165. "The restraint, if any, in this case does not attach itself to the title and the convey-
ance thereof but rather to the mortgage and the assumption thereof." Id. at -, 393 N.W.2d
at 848.
166. Id. at -, 393 N.W.2d at 849.
167. Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
168. Id. at 338.
169. Id. at 339.
170. Id. at 340.
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the defense will be discussed only briefly in the section below.
Other equitable defenses utilized by borrowers will be examined
more closely in a subsequent section.
1. Defense of Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation
Many decisions upholding this defense involve a land sale con-
tract and adopt the rationale of the 1974 California case, Tucker v.
Lassen Savings & Loan Association.171 Decisions in Arizona,
Washington and Michigan explicitly adopt this reasoning.
Bellingham First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Garri-
son72 distinguished an earlier Washington Supreme Court case,
Miller v. Pacific First Federal Savings & Loan Association,17 3
wherein a clause calling for a 2% increase on transfer-as opposed
to a due-on-sale/acceleration clause-was upheld. The Miller court
perceived the provision as affecting only the sale price and not the
actual transfer of the property.17 4 Bellingham, on the other hand,
involved a due-on-sale clause which the court refused to enforce
unless the lender could show that acceleration was necessary to
protect the lender's security. The court spoke in terms of both un-
reasonableness of restraint and violation of public policy.17 5 Thus,
the Bellingham case is cited for the proposition that unless ex-
pressly provided in the clause, Washington courts will refuse en-
forcement absent a showing of threat to security. 1 7
In Nichols v. Ann Arbor Federal Savings & Loan Association,7 7
also involving a land sale contract, the Michigan court followed
Tucker178 and distinguished Baker,7 9 Gunther,80 Malouff 8' and
Crockett.18 2 Upon the failure of the lender to claim waste or im-
171. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
172. 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976).
173. 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976).
174. Id. at -, 545 P.2d at 548-49.
175. 87 Wash. 2d at -, 553 P.2d at 1092-93.
176. Id. at -, 553 P.2d at 1091-92.
177. 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977).
178. 12 Cal.3d 624, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
179. 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
180. 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
181. 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
182. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
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pairment to security, the court ruled that if the sole basis for en-
forcement is to maintain the lender's portfolio, the restraint is
unreasonable. 83
Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court" held that although
restraints are not per se unreasonable, there must be a threat to
the legitimate interest of the lender to justify exercise.8 5
While Minnesota can clearly be regarded as "pro-lender" in the
case of investment residential property, it is pro-consumer when
borrower-occupied residential property is involved. The court ex-
pressly exempted this latter situation from its holding in Holiday
Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Savings & Loan Association,8 8
which adopted a freedom of contract approach to support enforce-
ment in the former situation.
183. 73 Mich. App. at -, 250 N.W.2d at 809.
184. Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975).
185. Id. at 64.
186. 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981). The court makes the following distinction:
The legislature, by enacting Minn. Stat. § 47.20, subd. 6 ... has determined, in ef-
fect, that the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in the transfer of borrower-occupied
residential property, as limited by the statute, is per se unreasonable except to pro-
tect against impairment of the lender's security interest. Accepting that determina-
tion, we hold that the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in the transfer of invest-
ment residential property is not per se unreasonable.
Id. at 484.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 47.20, Subd. 6 (Cum. Supp. 1980) reads as follows:
If the purpose of a conventional loan is to enable a borrower to purchase a one to
four family dwelling for his or her primary residence, the lender shall consent to the
subsequent transfer of the real estate if the existing borrower continues after transfer
to be obligated for repayment of the entire remaining indebtedness. The lender shall
release the existing borrower from all obligations under the loan instruments, if the
transferee (1) meets the standards of credit worthiness normally used by persons in
the business of making conventional loans, including but not limited to the ability of
the transferee to make the loan payments and satisfactorily maintain the real estate
used as collateral, and (2) executes an agreement in writing with the lender whereby
the transferee assumes the obligations of the existing borrower under the loan instru-
ments. Any such agreement shall not affect the priority, validity or enforceability of
any loan instrument. A lender may charge a fee not in excess of one-tenth of one
percent of the remaining unpaid principal balance in the event the loan or advance of
credit is assumed by the transferee and the existing borrower continues after the
transfer to be obligated for repayment of the entire assumed indebtedness. A lender
may charge a fee not in excess of one percent of the remaining unpaid principal bal-
ance in the event the remaining indebtedness is assumed by the transferee and the
existing borrower is released from all obligations under the loan instruments.
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2. Equitable Defenses.
As one commentator states, after due-on-sale clauses began to be
viewed as reasonable restraints on alienation "[c]hancellors . ..
began to display their historic 'conscience' as apparent inequities
and injustices were increasingly worked by the implementations of
these clauses.1187 This may be true, but for the litigator a two-
pronged attack is suggested: allege that the clause is both an un-
reasonable restraint on alienation and that it is unconscionable. In
the following cases the court relied upon equity to grant relief to
the borrower or purchaser.
The Oklahoma case of Continental Federal Savings & Loan As-
sociation v. Fetter188 is often cited for the proposition that it is
unconscionable for a court of equity to grant the lender's foreclo-
sure petition against the borrower. In this case, the lender condi-
tioned his consent to the transfer on the payment of a 1% fee. The
court found that there had been no bargained-for exchange, ex-
plaining that "[t]he rule of strict construction against the drafter
of the instrument is particularly applicable in the case of a con-
tract prepared by an expert or experienced party, and it has spe-
cial force where it is sought to create and impose an obligation
when none would otherwise appear."18
In Arizona, Baltimore Life Insurance Co. v. Harn 90 also found
in favor of the borrower on equitable grounds. Holding that the
lender could not arbitrarily enforce the clause without first demon-
strating that his security interest would be impaired, the court
commented: "[An action to accelerate and foreclose a mortgage
being an equitable proceeding, it is not enough to allege merely
that the acceleration clause has been violated.""' Clearly, in Ari-
zona, the lender has the burden of proof.
The Florida appellate court, in Clark v. Lachenmeier, 92 also
187. Comment, Mortgages-A Catalogue and Critique on the Role of Equity in the En-
forcement of Modern-Day "Due-On-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REv. 485, 486-87 (1973).
188. 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
189. Id. at 1019 (footnote omitted).
190. 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), pet. for rev. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d
1322 (1972).
191. 15 Ariz. App. at -, 486 P.2d at 193.
192. 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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held that the lender was not entitled to acceleration based solely
on the provisions of the due-on-sale clause without a showing of
impairment of security. The decision was based on the equitable
principle of uriconscionability. The Second District Court of Ap-
peals of Florida recently reaffirmed this view in a case which will
be discussed in connection with the issue of federal jurisdiction.193
Another Florida appellate jurisdiction, however, allowed the ac-
celeration of a due-on-sale clause in a mortgage securing a promis-
sory note. The court noted that this was an action at law involving
personal property and not one involving equitable principles. 194
Yet a third Florida opinion held that a provision of a mortgage,
making rents, issues and profits security and their assignment to a
third party grounds for foreclosure, was not triggered upon the sale
of the property, two apartment complexes. 95
The Arkansas case of Tucker v. Pulaski Federal Savings & Loan
Association9 ' is a widely cited decision involving equitable de-
fenses. The opinion is a factual discussion demonstrating that the
lender did not justify its refusal to consent to the sale.9 " Agreeing
with the Harn rationale, the court clearly placed the burden of go-
ing forward on the lender since the clause is not automatically
enforceable.
A Louisiana case, 98 which can perhaps be distinguished by the
fact that the transfer was between co-mortgagors, also stands for
the view that it is inequitable for the mortgagee to require a 1%
transfer fee for his consent when the provision for the fee is not
expressed in the mortgage contract.
C. Other Jurisdictions
The cases discussed in this section are representative of jurisdic-
tions which, either because of the unusual facts, conflicting appel-
193. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1980). See text accompanying notes 384-435 infra.
194. Stockman v. Burke, 305 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
195. Woodcrest Apartments, Ltd. v. IPA Realty Partners Richardson Palmer, 3rd Inv.
KG, 397 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
196. 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
197. Id. at -, 481 S.W.2d at 729-30.
198. Rayford v. Louisiana Say. Ass'n, 380 So. 2d 1232 (La. App. 1980).
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late opinions or confusing dicta in the decisions, are difficult to
categorize.
In two cases before the Wisconsin Court,"' enforcement was al-
lowed in one instance, and denied in the other. Wisconsin appears
to balance the equities on a case by case basis as is done in pro-
consumer oriented jurisdictions. But unlike those jurisdictions,
Wisconsin permits consideration of interest rate adjustment as a
factor in balancing and appears to place the burden on the mortga-
gor to affirmatively plead that the lender's security is not
impaired. 00
In the early decision of Peoples Savings Association v. Standard
Industries, Inc.,2 °1 the Ohio appellate court specifically concurred
with Justice Traynor in Coast Bank and ruled that the "right of
the mortgagee to protect its security by maintaining control over
the identity and financial responsibility of the purchaser is a legiti-
mate business objective and is not illegal, inequitable or contrary
to the public policy of the state of Ohio. '202 However, the economic
considerations of the lender were not named as one of these justifi-
able interests. Yet, despite the absence of any evidence of threat to
the security, the court allowed enforcement.
In 1980, the issue came before an Ohio court of appeals a second
time in Great Northern Savings Co. v. Ingarra.20 3 This time the
court reversed the trial court's decision that the clause was auto-
matically enforced and strongly disapproved of the lender's use of
the clause for reasons other than protection of security.
In New York, the highest court of appeals has yet to decide the
issue. Early opinions indicated a pro-lender stance-the clause was
deemed automatically enforceable unless the borrower met the
199. Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239
N.W.2d 20 (1976) (enforced); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Medical Servs.,
Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 210, 223 N.W.2d 921 (1974) (denied); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Wisconsin Wire Works, 58 Wis. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (1973) (remanded).
200. Bartke and Tagaropulos have suggested that Wisconsin should be designated as a
separate intermediate classification between pro-consumer and pro-lender jurisdictions.
Bartke & Tagaropulus, supra note 2, at 989.
201. 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970).
202. Id. at -, 257 N.E.2d at 408.
203. No. 9433 (Ohio 9th Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 23, 1980).
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burden of showing some equitable justification for refusal.20 4 In
two later cases, however, enforcement was denied.2 5 The later
opinions reflect a consumer-oriented approach since in both cases
the courts determined that it would be inequitable to permit a
lender to withhold his consent for adjustment of interest rates. As
will be discussed in section V of this article, the unique facts of
these two latter cases might permit their distinction in future
litigation.
The Utah case of Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson208 in-
volved a tangential examination of the due-on clause. The lender,
after losing on the issue that the mortgagor's late payments war-
ranted acceleration of the note, claimed that the mortgagor's trans-
fer of the property activated the due-on-sale clause. The court, af-
ter reciting that the clause was not void as against public policy,
held for the borrower on the basis that the clause was not self-
executing. No evidence had been presented showing the lender had
exercised its option to accelerate.07
Finally, the Supreme Court of Wyoming recently held in favor of
the mortgagor. In Young v. Hawks, 20 8 the court found that a due-
on-sale clause could not be implied when none was actually in the
contract.
IV. VIRGINIA LAW
While the applicability of the due-on-sale clause and ancillary
issues have been the subject of extensive litigation in recent years,
the highest courts of most states have yet to rule on these issues.
Two cases are presently on appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court,
providing the court with its first opportunity to address due-on-
sale clause issues.20 9
204. Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d
583 (1977); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1970).
205. Silver v. Rochester Sav. Bank, 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 945 (1980); Nichols v.
Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1978).
206. 26 Utah 2d 383, 490 P.2d 328 (1971).
207. Id. at -, 490 P.2d at 329.
208. 624 P.2d 235 (Wyo. 1981).
209. Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., Ch. No. 13246 (Cir. Ct. Prince William Co., Va., Mar.
19, 1980), appeal pending, No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct., _); Best v. United Va. Bank/Nat'l, Ch.
No. 58379 (Cir. Ct. Fairfax Co., Va., Feb. 22, 1979), appeal pending, No. 790777 (Va. Sup.
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In Lipps v. First American Service Corp.,210 the plaintiff exe-
cuted a land contract for the sale of a townhouse. At the time of
execution, the property was subject to a deed of trust which con-
tained paragraph 17 of the FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Mortgage In-
strument: "If all or any part of the property or an interest therein
is sold or transferred by borrower without lender's prior written
consent . . . lender may, at lender's option, declare all the sums
secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and
payable." 211
When the lender learned of the plaintiff's contract, which had
been duly recorded, it proceeded to commence foreclosure proceed-
ings on the property. The plaintiff subsequently sought injunctive
relief.212
The lender's principal contention was that the Virginia Legisla-
ture had expressly sanctioned the use of due-on-sale clauses
through section 6.1-330.34 of the Virginia Code,213 which provides:
MORTGAGE, ETC., TO CONTAIN NOTICE THAT DEBT IS
SUBJECT TO CALL OR MODIFICATION ON CONVEYANCE
OF PROPERTY. Where any loan is made secured by a mortgage or
deed of trust on real property comprised of not more than four fam-
ly residential dwelling units and the note, or mortgge or deed of
trust evidencing such loan contains a provision that the holder of
the note secured by such mortgage or deed of trust may accelerate
payment of or renegotiate the terms of such loan upon sale or con-
veyance of the security property or part thereof, then the mortgage
or deed of trust shall contain in the body or on the margin thereof a
statement, either in capital letters or underlined, which will advise
the borrower as follows: "Notice-The debt secured hereby is sub-
ject to call in full or the terms thereof being modified in the event of
sale or conveyance of the property conveyed. '214
Ct., _).
210. Ch. No. 13246 (Cir. Ct. Prince William Co., Va., Mar. 19, 1980), appeal pending, No.
800908 (Va. Sup. Ct., _).
211. 858 PRINCE WILLIAM Co., VA., LAND RECORDS, DEED BOOK 487. See note 24 supra.
212. Defendant's Trial Memorandum at 62-63, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., Ch. No.
13246 (Cir. Ct. Prince William Co., Va., Mar. 19, 1980).
213. Id. at 63-64.
214. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.34 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
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The lender then urged that, pursuant to section 55-95 of the Vir-
ginia Code215 the recorded contract had the effect of a deed, thus
triggering the due-on-sale clause.21 Finally, the defendant-lender,
relying on Glendale Federal v. Fox,21 7 argued that even in the ab-
sence of an applicable due-on-sale statute, federal preemption
would permit automatic enforcement of the clause by application
of Federal Home Bank Board (FHBB) policies2 8 and would pre-
clude any contrary finding by state courts.21 9
The circuit court found that the due-on-sale clause was enforce-
able in Virginia, and, given the plaintiff's breach of the clause
without the defendant's consent, the permanent injunction sought
by the plaintiff was denied.220 The trial court, however, failed to
make any mention of the federal preemption issue.221
On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court the borrower has al-
leged three points of error: (1) that the due-on-sale clause is unen-
forceable absent a showing of impairment of security; (2) that sec-
tion 6.1-330.34 of the Virginia Code is not determinative of the
issue of enforceability, but rather is intended to provide notice to
mortgagor of the presence of a due-on-sale clause; and (3) that sec-
tion 55-95 of the Virginia Code dealing with recordation of con-
tracts for sale of lands, serves to provide notice to any potential
good faith purchaser and does not have the effect of a deed so as to
constitute a transfer of title which triggers the due-on-sale
clause.222
From the above it is obvious that appellant is urging the court to
adopt the rationale of the Wellenkamp line of cases which prohib-
215. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-95 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
216. Defendant's Trial Memorandum at 64-65, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., Ch. No.
13246 (Cir. Ct. Prince William Co., Va., Mar. 19, 1980).
217. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
218. These policies are enumerated in 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (1980) and are evidenced by
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) & (g) (1980). For the text of these regulations see note 385 infra.
219. Defendant's Trial Memorandum at 66, Lipps v. First. Am. Serv. Corp., Ch. No.
13246 (Cir. Ct. Prince William Co., Va., Mar. 19, 1980).
220. Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., Ch. No. 13246 (Cir. Ct. Prince William Co., Va., Mar.
19, 1980).
221. Id. In its first finding, the decree states: "[T]he 'due on sale clause' does not violate
any applicable Federal law." Id. That does not mean federal law requires enforcement of
such clauses; the court carefully chose to bypass the federal preemption issue.
222. Brief for Appellant, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct., ).
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its the exercise of the clause unless the lender can demonstrate
some threat to his security interest.2 3 In the second point of error
the borrower asks the court to accord the Virginia due-on-sale stat-
ute the same degree of relevance as it was accorded in Wel-
lenkamp, where the California court, when asked to construe a
California statute similar to Virginia's declared: "[T]he purpose of
[such a provision] is to provide notice to borrower; it cannot be
reasonably interpreted in the manner the defendant suggests." 24
Appellant's counsel on the third point urges the court to reason
that since record title remains with the original mortgagor the exe-
cution of an executory installment sales contract should not be in-
terpreted as a transfer under the terms of the deed of trust.2 25
Also, appellant contends that, as in Tucker, even if the court were
to find that an installment sales contract is the equivalent of a
deed, the clause under these facts should not be enforced because
of the severe quantum of restraint on alienation.2 26 Interestingly,
appellants briefed the issue of federal law although it formed no
part of the trial court's decree.227
In the second case now on appeal before the Virginia Supreme
Court, Best v. United Virginia Bank/National,28 the lender re-
quired a 1% transfer fee and an increase in the interest rate of the
deed of trust as a condition of its consent to the transfer of resi-
dential property to plaintiffs-purchasers. Upon the purchaser's re-
fusal to accede to the demands of the lender, the original mortga-
gor conveyed the property by deed to the purchasers.
The trial court found that this clause was an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation because the lender failed to show an impair-
ment of its security interest. Moreover, the court found that if the
lender had wanted to reserve the right to increase the interest rate,
it should have specifically stated so in the deed of trust.2 29 As a
result, the court ruled that the plaintiff had the right to purchase
223. See text accompanying notes 110-208 supra.
224. 21 Cal. 3d at 953 n.12, 582 P.2d at 976 n.12, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.12.
225. See text accompanying notes 277-304 infra.
226. Brief for Appellant, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. _.
227. Id.
228. Ch. No. 58379 (Cir. Ct. Fairfax Co., Va., Feb. 22, 1979), appeal pending, No. 790777
(Va. Sup. Ct., _).
229. Id. at 3.
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the property upon the conditions of the deed of trust and that the
defendant was obligated to accept his payments on the note."'
On appeal, appellant has urged the Supreme Court of Virginia to
adopt the majority position on enforceability of due-on-sale clauses
which appellant has contended is represented by the Crockett,
Malouff and Gunther line of cases.2"1 The contentions of appel-
lant's brief mirror the rationales of these cases- that it is not nec-
essary for the lender to demonstrate an impairment to its security
to entitle it to rely upon the clause of the deed of trust.2"2 In a
reverse Britton type argument, appellant has argued that section
6.1-330.34 of the Virginia Code should not be applied retroac-
tively.23s Interestingly, in Britton the Alabama court struck down
the clause for the lender's failure to warn of its true intent, while
here appellant contends that absent the Virginia statute, the
lender need not disclose its intention of exercising the clause for
reasons other than the uncreditworthiness of an assignee.23 4
Appellees point to the preamble to the covenants of the deed of
trust: "[A]nd the said parties of the first part, in order more fully
to protect the security of this Deed of Trust, do hereby
agree. ... 2 Appellees, calling for strict interpretation of the
contract (the rationale of the Washington cases of Miller and Bel-
lingham),36 contend that the lender violated the very provisions it
drafted in attempting to impose conditions other than those ex-
pressly contained in the deed of trust.2 37 With the express purpose
of the deed of trust to protect the security interest of the lender,
the appellees argue that the lender could not have used more mis-
leading or devious language. 28 Appellees further contend that the
majority rule is represented by the pro-consumer line of cases, and
that the pro-lender cases cited in appellant's brief are based upon
the early California case of Coast Bank which was expressly over-
230. Id. at 4.
231. Brief for Appellant, Best v. United Va. Bank/Nat'l, No. 790777 (Va. Sup. Ct., _.
232. Id.
233. See text accompanying note 213 supra.
234. See notes 213 & 231 supra.
235. 3700 FAIRFAX CO., VA., LAND RECORDS, DEED BOOK 609, 610.
236. See notes 172-76 supra and accompanying text.
237. Brief for Appellee, Best v. United Va. Bank/Nat'l, No. 790777 (Va. Sup. Ct., _.
238. Id.
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ruled by Wellenkamp.3 e
In a third Virginia case, Iron Castle Associates v. Wood, 40 the
Circuit Court of Richmond considered the enforceability of a due-
on-sale clause upon an attempted foreclosure by a trustee. Plain-
tiff-purchaser sought an injunction to restrain the foreclosure sale,
alleging that the defendant-lender had unreasonably withheld its
consent to the transfer. After considering memoranda of both par-
ties, the court concluded that there was no clear majority view, but
that "since 1977 the due-on-sale clause is an unreasonable restraint
unless necessary to protect the lender's security and consent can-
not be withheld unless such a showing. "241 The court believed that
the better line of cases is that of Bellingham, Wellenkamp and
Silver.24 2 Also, since there was no right to anticipate the mortgage
(i.e., there was no prepayment clause), the facts of Iron Castle
were distinguished by the court from the "double risk" aspect
which had troubled the court in Crockett.243 Finally, the Virginia
court found that the enactment of section 6.1-330.34 of the Vir-
ginia Code represented no change in Virginia public policy toward
the enforceability of such clauses. 244 The defendant lender chose
not to appeal.
The decision in Iron Castle can perhaps be explained by the
provision in the deed of trust which provides that consent to trans-
fer will not be unreasonably withheld by the lender.2 45 Like the
New York court in Silver,24 e the Virginia court was impressed by
this express provision. Nevertheless, the Virginia court went fur-
ther in its broad declaration that such clauses constitute unreason-
able restraints on alienation and in its preference for the Belling-
ham and Wellenkamp requirement that impairment of security is
necessary to entitle the lender to accelerate. 4
239. Id.
240. Ch. No. G-4808-2 (Cir. Ct. Richmond, Va., Feb. 26, 1981).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.; See also text accompanying notes 441-48 infra.
244. Ch. No. G-4808-2 (Cir. Ct. Richmond, Va., Feb. 26, 1981).
245. "The Grantors covenant that they will not transfer the title to the property so long
as this deed of trust remains in full force and effect, without the consent of the holder or
holders of the two notes, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld." Id.
246. 73 A.D. 2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1980).
247. Ch. No. G-4808-2 (Cir. Ct. Richmond, Va., Feb. 26, 1981).
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In yet a fourth case arising in Virginia concerning the enforce-
ability of a due-on-sale clause, Williams v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Association,248 the conflict focused on whether the activity of
the borrowers constituted a transfer so as to activate the clause.
The plaintiffs-puichasers of the beneficial interests in three lands
trusts created by the original mortgagors and the plaintiff-trustee
of one of the trusts sought a declaratory judgment in federal dis-
trict court that the creation of land trusts and the subsequent
transfer of the beneficial interests did not constitute a sale or con-
veyance under the due-on-sale clause.24
In language stopping just short of holding that federal preemp-
tion applied without specifically mentioning it, the district court
ruled that:
"due on sale" clauses in issue in this case [are] governed by federal
law and the regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board....
The Arlington-Fairfax Savings and Loan Association, an institu-
tion chartered by the Commonwealth of Virginia, is also subject to
the jurisdiction of this Court by virtue of its membership in the
Federal Home Loan Bank, the insurance of its accounts by the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and its eligibility to
sell residential mortgages to the FHLMC2 50
After this determination of jurisdiction, the district court ruled
that the transfer of the real estate could not be disguised so as to
defeat the rights of the lender to accelerate under the due-on-sale
clause.28 1
The court of appeals affirmed the decision in a lengthy opin-
ion.25 2 In turn the court disposed of the following issues: (1) trans-
fers which activate the clause,253 (2) exemption under the
subordinate lien exclusion under paragraph 17 of the FNMA/
248. 500 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Va. 1980), ajf'd, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981).
249. 500 F. Supp. at 307-08.
250. Id. at 308 (citations omitted); see text accompanying notes 384-435 infra.
251. 500 F. Supp. at 309.
252. 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981) (four cases consolidated on appeal).
253. See text accompanying notes 277-304 infra.
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FHLMC uniform mortgage instrument document, 254 (3) restraint
on alienation,255 and (4) antitrust challenge.256 Circuit Court Judge
Murnaghan casually dismissed the plaintiff's contentions on each
issue.257 Although the Virginia decisions of Best v. United Virginia
Bank and Iron Castle Associates v. Wood were acknowledged, the
court distinguished both cases as involving "a flat restraint on
alienation; '258 also, "the deed of trust in each case [Best and Iron
Castle] antedated the 1974 enactment of Va. Ann. Code §§ 6.1-
330.33 and .34.''259
The court's reliance on sections 6.1-330.33 and .34 is misplaced.
The purpose of these sections is to provide notice of the existence
of a due-on-sale clause in the mortgage instrument.2 60 They in no
254. See text accompanying notes 277-332 infra.
255. See text accompanying notes 333-61 infra.
256. See text accompanying notes 452-59 infra.
257. 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981).
258. Id. at 925.
259. Id. at 926.
260. See text accompanying note 224 supra. The Wellenkamp court rejected the same
interpretation which the lender in Lipps has asked the Supreme Court of Virginia to
adopt-that the legislature impliedly sanctioned the automatic enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses by enacting a statute which provides for notice when such a clause is to be contained
in the loan instrument. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.34 might be distinguishable from CAL. CODE
§ 2924.5 (which was before the Wellenkamp court) on the basis that the former contains the
additional language: "or renegotiate the terms of such loan. . . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.
34 (Repl. Vol. 1979)(emphasis added). However, when that statute is viewed in light of its
precise wording, its code provisions, and the legislative history, § 6.1-330.34 appears more
restrictive than the California statute. The lender may enforce the due-on-sale clause, but
only if it expressly provides for the modification of the terms. The legislative committee on
Corporations, Insurance and Banking, to which the original bill was referred when it was
introduced, substituted the current language in § 6.1-330.34 for that of the original 1974 bill
which would have prohibited enforcement of a due-on-sale clause so long as the original
borrowers remained liable for repayment of the loan. Taken together, it appears that the
legislature deliberately chose to eliminate its enforcement for a hidden purpose (as ad-
dressed later by the Alabama court in Britton), rather than the blanket prohibition envi-
sioned under the original bill. The legislature opted for a result similar to that reached by
the Washington court in Miller-enforcement is permitted for interest rate adjustment if
such purpose is expressly contained within the document. The wording of § 6.1-330.34 sup-
ports this view: "Where any loan. . . contains a provision. . .[that the lender] may accel-
erate payment of or renegotiate the terms of such loan upon sale. . ., then the mortgage or
deed of trust shall contain in the body or on the margin thereof a statement. . . which will
advise the borrower [of the clause] . . . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.34 (Repl. Vol. 1979)
(emphasis added). Had the Virginia legislature wanted to blanketly endorse the automatic
enforcement of due-on clauses in the Commonwealth, the legislature certainly is sophisti-
cated enough to have drafted such a provision. It is hardly likely that the legislature in-
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manner define what constitutes the legitimate interests of the
lender which may be relied upon to exercise the clause."' Further,
any real difference in the language of the clauses, which would
cause them to be any more "a flat restraint on alienation" than the
FNMA/FHLMC uniform clause in Williams, is of doubtful signifi-
cance. 2 2 It may be that the court found a particular disdain for the
tended to broaden enforcement toward the class of borrowers protected in § 6.1-330.34.
Rather, the legislature sought to strike a balance between the needs of the lender and the
protection of the unskilled consumer.
Thus, the lender's position in Lipps is weakened. The FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Mortgage
Instrument contains no provision of the type required in § 6.1-330.34. Unless the court were
to construe the language of the notice which appears in the left margin of the first page of
the Lipps deed of trust, as a term of the document itself, the instrument fails to expressly
provide for renegotiation upon transfer. There are at least two reasons why the court should
not do so. First, the wording of the statute itself suggests that the deed of trust contain both
a provision and a notice. In addition, it would be illogical to have the very notice designed to
protect the consumer serve as the due-on-sale clause, whose exercise the legislature sought
to regulate. The Wellenkamp court dealt with this issue and found that the notice clause
served as notice required by statute but should not be considered an additional term of the
agreement between the parties. Paragraph 10 of the Uniform Mortgage Instrument would
also cause the borrower to believe that creditworthiness of the transferee is the key factor
for lender's consent as the document now reads within its four corners.
Finally, it could also be contended that by expressly prohibiting the enforcement of the
due-on-sale clause upon a further encumbrance of the property as applied to the one-to-four
family residential dwellings in § 6.1-2.5, the legislature sanctioned the exercise of due-on-
sale clauses in other situations. The better interpretation of the two statutes is that the
legislature sought only to absolutely protect the borrower in the La Sala situations, i.e.,
execution of a second mortgage. Section 6.1-330.34 should not be expanded by a liberalized
reading of § 6.1-2.5. Further, § 6.1-330.33 also evidences a desire on the part of the Virginia
legislature to protect residential homeowners from the inequities resulting when demand for
prepayment penalties is made upon acceleration of maturity by the call of the loan. No
mention is made in § 6.1-330.33 of the situation where acceleration results from the failure
of a transferee to accede to the modified terms posed by the lender. The legislature, in
enacting this series of acts aimed specifically to the residential borrower, did not mean to
afford the skilled businessman another weapon against the unskilled homeowner, but sought
to shift the balance toward "arms of equal length."
261. See text accompanying notes 305-32 infra.
262. Comparing the clauses in Best, Lipps and Williams, one finds little difference. In
fact, Lipps and Williams used the FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Mortgage Instrument. See note
24 supra. The language of the clause in Best, although not the same, does not vary
substantially:
And the said parties of the first part, in order more fully to protect the security of
this Deed of Trust, do hereby agree as follows:
7. The maker of the note covenants and agrees that he will not assign or transfer the
property secured by this deed of trust without prior approval of the noteholder.
3700 FAIRFAX CO., VA. LAND RECORDS, DEED BOOK 610-11. The clause in Best does not pre-
clude transfer any more than does 1 17 of the FNMA/FHLMC form. The express purpose
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"attempted ingenuity"26 employed by appellants' counsel in at-
tempting to prove that a sale is not a sale.264 It is unfortunate that
the first case to reach the appellate level in Virginia was decided
on these facts and these grounds. The preferred result would have
been for the court to face squarely the issues of reasonableness of
restraint and interpretation.
The two cases now before the Supreme Court of Virginia provide
the court with several options. The court might take a sweeping
pro-lender stance that mortgage portfolio adjustment is a legiti-
mate purpose for the exercise of the clause. It could, conversely,
take the approach that the due-on-sale clauses are unenforceable
as written unless the lender proves that the security has been im-
paired. The evidence in neither case shows any threat to the
security.
On the other hand, the decisions could turn on the particular
facts presented in each case, which could result in a decision either
to affirm or to reverse either case. The court could affirm the Best
case on the principle of strict interpretation of the contract.265 The
decision in Best could be reversed under the restraint on alienation
view that an outright sale results in slight quantum of restraint.
2 66
Conversely, since an installment land sales contract is involved in
the Lipps case, the court could reverse the trial court under the
rationale of Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association26 7_-that
is, the greatest quantum of restraint of alienation is imposed upon
transfer by a land sales contract. The result of the trial court's de-
cision in Lipps could be affirmed on the basis of federal
preemption.268
for acceleration for interest rate adjustment is not provided in any of the three. The clause
in Iron Castle differs only (but perhaps significantly) in that "consent shall not be unrea-
sonably withheld." See note 245 supra. May the borrower rely upon the traditional reason
(custom?) for withholding consent? Does the absence of such a phrase impliedly expand the
intention of the parties to permit acceleration for interest rate adjustment? What was the
parties' real and original intent? One can only echo other authors who have called for a new
mortgage form. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 30; O'Connell, supra note 15.
263. 651 F.2d at 918.
264. Id. at 918 n.13.
265. See text accompanying notes 305-32 infra.
266. See text accompanying notes 333-43 infra.
267. See notes 59-67 supra and accompanying text.
268. See text accompanying notes 305-32 infra.
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The court could also examine the two cases for inequity or un-
conscionability. e9 Since neither the clause in Lipps nor that in
Best expressly provided for acceleration for the purpose of interest
rate adjustment, the real motive for which exercise is now sought
may have been hidden from the borrower when the deed of trust
was executed.70 Whether the court adopts this approach or not, it
is hoped that the court will resist the invitation offered by the
lender in Lipps to misconstrue section 6.1-330.34 of the Virginia
Code. 7 1 The true intent of the statute is to forewarn a borrower of
the presence of a due-on clause. The statute does not conclusively
decide, in either case, either the legality of enforceability or what
constitutes a legitimate justification for exercise of a due-on
clause. 72 Specifically exempted from the code section are deeds of
trust on "property comprised of not more than four family residen-
tial dwelling units." It can hardly be contended that Virginia is
any less concerned than its sister states which have recognized that
the residential homeowner needs more protection than the com-
mercial mortgagor. As several courts have maintained, freedom of
contract only strikes a balance when the parties are on equal
footing.273
Since the two Virginia cases have been consolidated on appeal, it
appears that the court is prepared to define a general policy to-
ward due-on-sale clauses. Texas and Minnesota, the two jurisdic-
tions to have most recently considered the issue, each have issued
definitive statements of the law.27 4 Texas favors the pro-lender
view, namely, that the clause is reasonable per se and exercise is
permitted for the sole purpose of increasing mortgage portfolio
yield.27 5 Minnesota, conversely, requires that the lender demon-
strate an impairment to security before exercise of the clause is
permitted against the residential homeowner. 6 It is time for Vir-
269. See text accompanying notes 362-75 infra.
270. See text accompanying notes 305-32 infra.
271. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.34 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
272. See note 260 supra.
273. See text accompanying notes 381-83 infra.
274. Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Minn. -, 308 N.W.2d 471
(1981); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
275. Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex Civ. App. 1981).
276. Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Minn. -, 308 N.W.2d 471
(1981).
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ginia to pick a side.
V. A CHECKLIST
A. Is the Clause Triggered?
The initial inquiry of anyone involved in a real estate transac-
tion to be closed by any form of mortgage takeover 27 must be:
What will or will not activate the due-on clause providing the
lender with the option of accelerating the maturity of the debt?
Not only an outright sale 27' but any of several varied transac-
tions may fall within the scope of transfers potentially prohibited
by the clause. They include: sale on land contract;27 9 lease;280 de-
vise, descent or distribution on death;281 secondary financing8 2 or
any realization of borrower's equity by further encum-
brance-voluntary or involuntary; 83 sale and leaseback;28' and sale
and buyback.85 In a commercial setting the clause may be sophis-
ticated enough to prevent transfers of partnership or stock inter-
est; transfers of management responsibilities; or transfers of bene-
277. This assumes that a due-on-sale clause exists in the current mortgage. Takeover is
distinguished here from refinancing in that the former involves any arrangement whereby
the purchaser takes the property "subject to" the existing mortgage or assumes the existing
mortgage obligation, whereas with refinancing the existing mortgage is paid in full. See A.
AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 204-74.
278. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 30, at 914-16. The court in Wellenkamp ex-
plained: "We do not here so restrict the meaning of the term 'outright sale,' but instead, and
in accordance with actual real estate parlance, we refer by that term to any sale by the
trusts of property wherein legal title (and usually possession) is transferred." 21 Cal. 3d at
950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
279. See Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 663 (1974).
280. Paragraph 17 expressly exempts leases of three years or less unless an option to
purchase is included. See note 24 supra.
281. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 30, at 893.
282. Matis, supra note 10, at 407. See also Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 300-02.
283. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 30, at 893-94.
284. Id. at 893. See also A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 1030-
48. "As the name implies, a sale-and-lease-back agreement commonly involves a sale of land
and buildings to an investor ... which simultaneously leases them back upon a long-term
contract, frequently making some provision for renewal or repurchase." Cary, Corporate Fi-
nancing Through the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax and Policy Consid-
erations, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1948).
285. See A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 134.
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ficial interests in ownership. 8
Efforts persist in devising ways to circumvent the clause.28" 7 Re-
cent attempts by drafters to circumvent the clause have, by in
large, been cooly received by the courts.288
The borrower in Williams v. First Federal Savings & Loan As-
sociation,19 in an obvious attempt to avoid the clause, executed a
land trust agreement conveying the property to herself as trustee,
and then assigned all of her interest as beneficiary under the trust
to the purchaser. The borrower also contended that the Virginia
land trust statute29 0 controlled, causing the creditor's right to fol-
low through the creation of the trust.2 91 The Federal District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the transfer, however
labeled, plainly constituted a sale causing breach of the due-on-
sale clause.292 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the district court in May, 1981.93 It should be empha-
sized that the borrower did not primarily contest the validity of
the clause, but rather attempted to avoid activating it by this form
of transfer.
In those cases where an attack focused both on equitable
grounds and on the "is a sale really a sale" argument, challengers
met with more success. 214 In Rayford v. Louisiana Savings Associ-
ation,9 5 a 1980 opinion, the principal issue presented was whether
the due-on-sale clause was intended to govern transfers between
co-mortgagers. The case also involved a Louisiana statute29 6 which
286. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 30, at 893.
287. See Liss, Drafting Around the Mortgage "Due-on-Sale" Clause in the Installment
Sale of Real Estate, 1981 CHi. B. REC. 312.
288. Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 300.
289. 500 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff'd, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981). For a more
complete discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes 248-63 supra.
290. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-17.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981) reads in part: "Nothing in this section
shall be construed (1) to affect any right which a creditor may otherwise have against a
trustee or beneficiary ... "
291. 500 F. Supp. at 308-09.
292. Id. at 309.
293. 651 F.2d 910.
294. See, e.g., Rayford v. Louisiana Say. Ass'n, 380 So. 2d 1232 (La. App. 1980); Nichols
v. Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1978).
295. 380 So. 2d 1232 (La. App. 1980).
296. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:837 (West Supp. 1981) reads in pertinent part:
A. Whenever property is subject to a ... mortgage in favor of an association and,
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the court ultimately determined to be inapplicable to the facts.
The court found that the contract was ambiguous and, construing
it against the lender, held the clause could not restrict such trans-
fers. 29 7 Significantly, however, the court did not stop there but
couched a second compelling reason for the holding-that the
lender could not condition its approval upon the payment of a loan
transfer fee absent a showing that security would be impaired.2 9
In a recent New York case,299 a jurisdiction perhaps previously
considered lender-oriented,300 the court held it clearly would be in-
equitable to permit the lender to accelerate when the transfer in-
volved' the borrowers' conveyance to a corporation in which the
borrowers were the principals. Unlike the Williams case, the attack
in Nichols v. Evanss°1 centered on the equitability of enforcement
when transfer is involved.
Recent controversy has also arisen over the interpretation of the
"subordinate lien or encumbrance" section of paragraph seventeen
of the FNMA/IFHLMC Uniform Mortgage instrument.302 Borrow-
ers who have sold mortgaged property and taken back some form
of secondary financing have contended such transfers are expressly
exempted from sales designation under the clause.303 Although no
decisions yet have addressed this issue squarely, it is likely that
this argument will receive limited success.304 It would appear from
the cases that any real challenge should be merged with equitable
relief.
without the written consent of the latter, the property is sold or transferred, by con-
tract, either with or without the assumption of the association loan, the loan and
obligation held by the association shall at the option of the association immediately
mature and become at once subject to enforcement according to law and to the terms
of the loan contract.
297. 380 So. 2d at 1238. Interestingly, the due-on clause involved was the boilerplate pro-
vision of S 17 of the FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Mortgage Instrument. See note 24 supra.
298. 380 So. 2d at 1239.
299. Nichols v. Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 928, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1978).
300. For a list of New York cases cited see note 118 supra.
301. 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1978).
302. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 300-01.
303. Id.
304. Id. Under VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.4(23) (Cum. Supp. 1981), a land contract is con-
sidered a vendor's lien. Although this might lend weight to this argument in Virginia, it
appears that the true intent was to exclude second mortgages executed by the original mort-
gagor. See text accompanying notes 305-32 infra.
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B. Specificity of the Language of the Clause
With one exception,30 5 no court in the United States has denied
enforcement of a due-on-sale clause where the overt purpose of in-
creasing the interest rate as a condition for consent to the sale was
specifically mentioned in the clause."0 In fact courts which have
refused the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause often have specifi-
cally reserved from their decisions the situation where the right to
increase the rate of interest upon sale of the mortgaged property is
drafted into the clause. 7 While denying enforcement, other courts
have focused upon the hidden,30 8 the collateral,30 9 or the mislead-
ing3 1 0 purpose of allowing interest rate adjustment where the
clause fails to expressly provide notice to the consumer that the
lender intends to accelerate the loan for reasons other than trans-
fer to an uncreditworthy transferee.311
Representative of such a view is the opinion in Silver v. Roches-
ter.31 2 After determining that it would constitute an intrinsic
breach of the contract with the borrower to allow the lender to
condition approval of sale upon an interest rate increase, the court
held that the clause should not be construed beyond its "normal
inference" of protection of the security upon transfer. The court
also held that to grant a right to withhold approval for interest
note adjustment is a "giant step,"31 3 a step the court was unwilling
to take.11 4
One author, in his 1979 assessment of due-on-sale clause cases,
305. Great N. Say. Co. v. Ingarra, No.. 9433 (9th Cir. 1980).
306. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 306.
307. See, e.g., Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250
N.W.2d 804 (1977).
308. First S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
309. Great N. Sav. Co. v. Ingarra, No. 9433 (9th Cir. 1980).
310. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 304.
311. In Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Okla. 1977),
the court stated that: "The rule of strict construction against the drafter of the instrument
is particularly applicable in the case of the contract prepared by an expert or experienced
party, and it has special force where it is sought to create and impose an obligation when
none would otherwise appear."
312. 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1980).
313. Id. at -, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 947. The clause also contained language that consent would
not be unreasonably withheld. Id. at -, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
314. Id. at -, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
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has concluded that most of the clauses as presently worded belie
their intended use, the increase of the interest rate upon sale. 15
Other authors have observed "a lack of candor in the drafting of
the security instrument in a manner which would advise a bor-
rower that conditions for nonexercise of the acceleration right
might exist or what they were. '31 6
A companion issue is the effect to be given language in a due-on-
sale clause which provides that consent will not be unreasonably
withheld. In Silver v. Rochester Savings Bank3 17 it was concluded
that such an express covenant made it improper for the lender to
condition its consent to a sale to a creditworthy transferee upon an
increase in the rate of interest.
The most troublesome issue, however, is the degree of responsi-
bility to be placed on the lender in the exercise of the clause when,
as is usually the case, the clause makes no mention either that the
lender may exercise the clause to secure interest rate adjustments
or that the lender is under covenant to act reasonably in the deci-
sion to accelerate.318 In two cases decided just prior to the Silver
decision where no express restriction of reasonableness was placed
on the lender's conduct, the court refused to imply a duty to act
reasonably in conditioning consent.319 In both instances the court
recognized that enforcement might be refused if the effect of accel-
eration would be unconscionable or unfair but that the burden of
proof fell upon the borrower.3 20 In contrast, the courts in Tucker v.
Pulaski Federal Savings & Loan Association3 21 and Clark v.
Lachenmeier3 22 found the exercise of the clause to be inequitable
and unconscionable in the absence of specific proof of impairment
of security. In Sanders v. Hicks3 23 the Mississippi court adopted
this latter rationale and held that the issue of reasonableness
315. O'Connell, supra note 15, at 946.
316. Subcommittee Report, supra note 30, at 935.
317. 73 A.D.2d at _, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
318. See FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Mortgage Instrument 17, supra note 24.
319. Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395 N.Y.S.2d'
583 (1977); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1970).
320. See Bartke & Tagaropulos, supra note 2, at 985 (importance of burden of proof).
321. 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
322. 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1970).
323. 317 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975).
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would be determined on a case-by-case approach, yet in Baker v.
Loves Park Savings & Loan Association,3 24 the Illinois court re-
jected this case-by-case approach and opted for the per se reasona-
bleness of restraint approach which does not require the lender to
establish proof of reasonableness.
Here the equitable defenses of unreasonableness of restraint, un-
conscionability, inequity and duty to act reasonably become hope-
lessly merged. It may well be that the determinative factor in each
case is the court's pre-disposition as to who should bear the burden
of proof. Should the lender show justification for exercise or should
the borrower show unreasonableness? 325 The key issue still remains
whether, absent express authorization for interest rate adjustment
in the clause, the lender may properly accelerate the debt for rea-
sons other than an increased risk to the security. When dealing
with equitable defenses and notions of balancing the equities, it
obviously is wise to be as explicit as possible when drafting a due-
on clause.3 26
Since the real operators of the secondary mortgage market re-
quire the use of a uniform mortgage document containing para-
graph 17 prior to their purchase of mortgage paper from primary
lenders, the FNMA/FHLMC form is the most widely used lan-
guage in a mortgage clause.32 7 The principal recent judicial activity
regarding this clause has revolved around the issues of federal pre-
emption and whether transfers involving secondary financing de-
vices are exempt from the effect of paragraph 17. The first of these
issues will be discussed later in detail.3 28 The thrust of the latter
issue is that the borrower, by transferring the property and taking
back some form of secondary lien, may exempt such a transfer
from the prohibition of the clause as provided in exclusion (a) of
paragraph 17 which reads in part: "17. Transfer of the Property;
Assumption. If all or any part of the Property or an interest
therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior
324. 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975).
325. See Bartke & Tagarpulos, supra note 2, at 985.
326. See generally Subcommittee Report, supra note 30.
327. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981). See
note 24 supra for text of 1 17.
328. See text accompanying notes 384-435 infra.
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written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encum-
brance subordinate to this Mortgage ... .
Such attempts to avoid the activation of the clause may take any
of several forms: by installment contract, by deed and second
mortgage back, or by deed and wraparound mortgage back.330 It
would appear that the real purpose of exception (a) of the uniform
document is not to exempt transfers where the borrower-seller re-
tains some type of vendor's lien but rather to exempt the La Sala
type situations where a subordinate lien is created "upon the bor-
rower's interest."33' Unofficial opinions of counsel for both the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) support such a view33 2
which appears to be the true intention and the better reasoned in-
terpretation of the exclusion.
C. Restraint on Alienation
The vast majority of jurisdictions have found that the exercise of
the clause results in some restraint on alienation. 3 Thus, the real
issues in the cases involved the test for reasonableness, the burden
of proof and sometimes the concepts of direct and indirect
restraints.3 4
329. See note 24 supra. See also text accompanying notes 277-304 supra.
330. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 301.
331. Id.
332. Id. at Appendices A & B.
333. See generally O'Connell, supra note 15, and Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30.
334. See generally authorities cited in note 30 supra. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978); Holiday Acres No. 3 v.
Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Minn. -, 308 N.W.2d 471 (1981); Occidental Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980); Crockett v. First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976); and Sonny Arnold, Inc. v.
Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981). RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §
404(1) (1944) defines a restraint on alienation:
A restraint on alienation, as that phrase is used in this Restatement, is an attempt by
an otherwise effective conveyance or contract to cause a later conveyance
(a) to be void; or
(b) to impose contractual liability on the one who makes the later conveyance when
such liability results from a breach of an agreement not to convey; or
(c) to terminate or subject to termination all or part of the property interest
conveyed.
One writer concluded that:
[T]he due-on-sale clause does not fit exactly within any of the established categories
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A few jurisdictions have disagreed entirely that the exercise of
the clause results in any restraint on alienation.335 A Montana
case 336 and an early Washington case a3  both found that enforce-
ment of the clause resulted in a restraint on a mere contractual
interest and not on the actual transfer itself. In Occidental Savings
& Loan Association v. Venco,33 the Nebraska court agreed with
this analysis and rejected the concepts of "indirect restraint and
practical alienability."339 The court, in language which must be
considered a lender's dream, stated:
the error committed by most jurisdictions in deciding this matter is
their willingness to assume that a due-on-sale clause is a restraint on
alienation and that the only issue is reasonableness .... [T]he
'due-on-sale' clause is not a restraint on alienation as that concept is
legally defined.... [It] cannot be so considered for any purpose,
theoretical or practical.3 40
In going further, however, the court seemed to be applying the fa-
miliar balancing test of Tucker-quantum of restraint versus justi-
fication for restraint. 41
The potential failure of savings and loan associations and the loss of
their depositors' funds should be of no less a concern to the courts
than the inability of a property owner to transfer its mortgage at a
premium when selling its property. Balancing portfolio return with
of direct restraints, disabling, forfeiture or promissory .... [However, the] due-on-
sale clause is so closely akin to the promissory restraint as to justify designating it a
direct restraint.
Volkiner, The Application of the Restraints in Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Se-
curity Interests, 58 IowA L. REv. 747, 773-74 (1973). In Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, -, 250 N.W.2d 804, 806 (1977), the court found that if "the
mortgage clause defendant seeks to enforce can be labeled a restraint on alienation only by
expanding the restatement definition, we do not hesitate to stretch the term to include this
'due-on-sale' clause."
335. Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843
(1980); Miller v. Pacific First Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976);
Dobitz v. Oakland, 172 Mont. 126, 561 P.2d 441 (1977).
336. Dobitz v. Oakland, 172 Mont. 126, 561 P.2d 441 (1977).
337. Miller v. Pacific First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 328 (1971).
338. 206 Neb. 469. 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980).
339. Id. at -, 293 N.W.2d at 847.
340. Id. at -, 293 N.W.2d at 845.
341. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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cost of money is an important factor in the survival of lending as-
sociations. The due-on-sale clause is an important device in main-
taining that balance.342
Viewed in this light, it appears that the Nebraska court actually
perceived the restraint as insignificant, rather than non-existent,
when weighed against the public benefit to be gained by allowing
lenders to enforce the clause. It should be noted that the impact of
this opinion on the residential borrower is weakened somewhat by
the fact that the security consisted of unimproved urban land. 43
The insight, if any, to be gained from the Wellenkamp and Occi-
dental rationales is that the real battleground concerns the issue of
what should go into the scales to be balanced.
D. Is the Restraint on Alienation Reasonable?
As noted in the previous section, only a few cases have ruled
that the due-on-sale clause does not result in any restraint on
alienation. 44 No court has directly held that the due-on-sale clause
is invalid per se.3 45 Rather most courts have struggled to balance
the conflicting interests of the economic triangle-lender, mortga-
gor and purchaser.34 6 To determine the reasonableness of the re-
straint in this balancing process, courts have attempted to assign
merit to each of several factors under the rationale made popular
by the California courts. This rationale measures the quantum of
the restraint against the justification for enforcement.3 47 A pinch of
public policy has been thrown into this boiling stew although
courts have disagreed completely, sometimes heatedly, as to whose
interests genuinely represent the public interests. 8 Other courts
342. 206 Neb. at -, 293 N.W.2d at 849.
343. "The land in question was unimproved urban land- subject to a 30-year mort-
gage. . . . It is not realistic to argue that the owner here intended the mortgage to remain in
effect for the entire mortgage term. . . ." Id. at -, 293 N.W.2d at 846.
344. See cases cited in note 335 supra.
345. See text accompanying notes 112-208 supra.
346. Id.
347. See Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1974). See also text accompanying notes 42-109 supra.
348. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379 (1978) (dissenting opinion); Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 3d
876, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1979) (majority and concurring opinion). See also text accompany-
ing notes 112-208 supra.
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have resisted the temptation to use the conflict before it as a fo-
rum to legislate public policy and have restricted their decision to
the issue before it through strict interpretation of the contract.3 49
The traditional justification for exercise of the due-on-sale
clause has been to protect a lender against risk to its security upon
non-payment and threat to the security by waste or deprecia-
tion.350 The more recent justification for a due-on-sale clause is the
protection of the lender's portfolio from the economics of rising
interest rates.351 This latter justification draws the battle lines be-
tween borrowers and lenders. In times of rapid inflation the risks
upon default and subsequent foreclosure are minimal.3 52 Courts
have also scrutinized the individual circumstances of each case353
in an effort to distinguish the facts and to accurately weigh the
merits of each situation, 54 such as the type of lender,55 type of
borrower 3 6 and the nature of property serving as security.3 17 Ab-
sent a clause specifically providing for adjustment of interest rates
upon transfer of the secured property, courts have split on the is-
349. See text accompanying notes 305-32 supra.
350. See Matis, supra note 10.
351. Id.
352. With the advent of private mortgage insurers, conventional lenders can now shift the
risk of default on high loan-to-value mortgages. [FHA and VA mortgages under the
National Housing Act of 1934 are insured and guaranteed respectively so that the
lender will not bear any loss resulting from a defaulted loan-the U.S. government
bears the loss].
Other factors that cushion the lender's risk when making seemingly dangerous
loans are exacting credit standards, a steady full employment economy, and a housing
demand that exceeds the available supply. Time also works in the lender's favor, even
though, as we shall see, the rate of mortgage reduction usually begins quite modestly.
The pressures of inflation and scarcity tend to force up real estate values, adding to
the owner's equity wholly apart from mortgage reduction. Moreover, inflation also
allows the debtor to repay fixed dollars of debt service with dollars of shrinking value,
thereby making default itself less likely.
A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 102.
353. See Sanders v. Hicks, 319 So. 2d 61 (Miss. 1975). See also text accompanying notes
305-32 supra. But see Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 11. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1
(1975).
354. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 982 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting).
355. See text accompanying notes 376-80 infra.
356. See text accompanying notes 381-83 infra.
357. See text accompanying notes 381-83 & 436-40 infra.
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sue of the weight to be given lenders' portfolio concerns. 58
The Ohio Court of Appeals has strongly denounced the legiti-
macy of protecting a lender's portfolio through the exercise of a
due-on clause:
The purpose of purchasing land by note and mortgage is not only
to acquire land, but also to purchase the use of money at the then
current rate of interest. Business risks of all kinds, including those
pronounced by economic inflation, are factored into the then current
interest rate.... The balancing process which we require... must
recognize more than the lending institution's desire to update its
portfolio or increased profits .... [I]t must also consider the prop-
erty rights of the [mortgagors]. In this regard, we believe that the
balance by the Tucker court ...is the correct one: "When such
enforcement is not reasonably necessary to protect the lender's se-
curity, the lender's use of the clause to extract collateral benefits
must be held an unlawful restraint on alienation. ' 5 9
Yet, in the strongest expression of the pro-lender view, the Ne-
braska court found that balancing portfolio return with the cost of
money is essential to the survival of lenders.3 60 The Attorney Gen-
eral of Maryland, expressing similar sentiment in an opinion letter
on the issue, felt that the exercise of the clause to permit the
lender to maintain its portfolio was not only an unlawful restraint
but also a violation of public policy.361
E. Unconscionable or Inequitable to Enforce
Numerous opinions state that although the clause is activated
and appears enforceable on its face, courts in equity may refuse to
enforce the due-on-sale clause if enforcement would be uncon-
scionable or unfair. 6 2 However, the majority of courts have then
gone on to find that the lender's refusal of consent to assignment is
358. See text accompanying notes 305-32 supra.
359. Great N. Say. Co. v. Ingarra, No. 9433 (9th Cir. 1980).
360. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843
(1980).
361. Letter, supra note 25.
362. See, e.g., Miller v. Pacific Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, -, 545 P.2d 546,
548 (1976). See also Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 822 (1979).
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neither unconscionable nor inequitable. 6 3 The few cases which
have barred enforcement due to unconscionability or the inequity
between the parties have generally hinged on the special facts of
the case, such as that the conveyance by the borrowers was to a
corporation in which they were the principals3 6 4 or that the lender
held some unfair advantage by, or gained some personal interest
in, withholding consent.36 5
Some courts have denied enforcement on the basis that if en-
forcement is allowed absent a showing of impairment to the
lender's security, it permits the lender to enforce the clause for a
hidden purpose-a purpose other than that which the parties bar-
gained for and one which catches the borrower unaware.366 The
lender should have provided notice to the borrower of its intention
to exercise the clause for interest rate adjustment.367 Although
some authors would gloss over this "lack of notice" issue,3ee it ap-
pears that for mortgages of earlier dates, this purpose for accelera-
tion is one that neither lender nor borrower contemplated due to
the unforeseeability of climbing interest rates. It may be an exact-
ment of a condition not provided in the contract-a result which
permits the lender an unfair advantage because of the vague and
general nature of the language of the clause. 9
Other courts have criticized any forfeiture or penalty resulting
from enforcement of the clause absent a showing of impairment of
security or a reasonable ground for accepting the new transferee. 70
363. See e.g., Mutual Real Estate Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Say. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 395
N.Y.S.2d 583 (1977). But see Rayford v. Louisiana Say. Ass'n, 380 So. 2d 1232 (La. App.
1980).
364. Nichols v. Evans, 92 Misc. 2d 938, 401 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1978).
365. Silver v. Rochester Say. Bank, 73 A.D.2d 81, 424 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1980). (The lender
was the tenant of the borrower. Upon the sale of the property, the lender demanded an
increase in the interest rate for the sole purpose of portfolio adjustment. The new purchaser
then demanded an increase in rent. The lender refused.)
366. See text accompanying notes 305-32 supra. See also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977).
367. See O'Connell, supra note 15, at 946.
368. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 308.
369. See text accompanying notes 305-32 supra.
370. Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Harm, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), cert. denied,
108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d 1322 (1972); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849,
481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). But
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This seems an especially troublesome issue when the exactment is
a transfer fee rather than interest rate increase.37
1
Still other courts have considered the traditional concepts of
waiver, 372 estoppel37 3 and laches.3 7 4 These defenses obviously are
dependent upon particular facts, and enforcement depends on eq-
uity under the circumstances of the case. There appears to be no
valid reason why the due-on-sale clause should be treated differ-
ently than the more traditional acceleration clauses based on de-
fault and as such it should remain subject to equitable defenses.3 7 5
This absence of notice to borrower of lender's intention to exercise
the clause for reasons other than assumption by an uncreditworthy
assignee appears to be easily cured by appropriate drafting.
F. Institutional or Private Lender
In the landmark Wellenkamp case, the court specifically limited
its holding to the institutional lender and introduced the uncer-
tainty of whether the restraints on enforcement of the clause
should apply to the private lender. No reason was given why the
court expressly reserved from its opinion the issue of whether a
private lender might be justified in automatically enforcing a due-
on-sale clause. Several authors have suggested reason to justify the
distinction. 37 6 The key reasons revolve around the limited sophisti-
cation of the private lender and the relatively equal bargaining po-
see Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 313 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1970); Mutual Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976).
371. See Rayford v. Louisiana Say. Ass'n, 380 So. 2d 1232 (La. App. 1980); Continental
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
372. Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. Land Dynamics, 103 Cal. App. 3d 968, 163 Cal. Rptr.
348 (1980); Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 62 Cal. App. 3d 317, 133 Cal. Rptr. 63
(1976).
373. Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d
1090 (1976).
374. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239
N.W.2d 20 (1976).
375. See O'Connell, supra note 15, at 933 n.7. But see Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976) (clause held not to be an acceleration
clause but instead a clause which directly permitted increase in interest rate upon transfer
of property, when clause expressly provided for increase on transfer).
376. See, e.g., Goodman, The Wellenkamp Decision: How it Will Affect Real Estate Fi-
nancing, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 34, 38 (1979); Hetland, After Wellenkamp, CAL. REAL EsT., Jan.
1979, at 38; Note, supra note 27, at 301.
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sitions of the parties. 37 7 Further, private lenders, unlike institu-
tional lenders, are ill equipped to assess lending risks, and credit
and personal backgrounds are less accessible. 3 7  These reasons
might well justify the automatic enforcement of the clause. How-
ever, in three cases decided after Wellenkamp which involved non-
institutional lenders, enforcement was permitted in two in-
stances 79 and was refused in another.a80
G. Commercial or Residential Borrower
Many lenders have claimed that there is a valid distinction be-
tween residential and commercial loans, primarily based on the rel-
atively equal bargaining positions and sophistication inherent in
the commercial transactions. 81 Such lack of any adhesion contract
overtones permits a freedom of contract which should not be dis-
turbed by the courts. 2  It appears from a survey of the cases that
the courts are influenced by this rationale, and are more inclined
to permit enforcement of the clause in the setting of commercial
transactions.383
377. See Note, supra note 27, at 301.
378. Goodman, supra note 376, at 40.
379. Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n; 89 Cal. App. 3d 876, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572
(1979) (enforcement allowed). In Dawn Inv. Co., Inc. v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d
439, -, 172 Cal. Rptr. 142, 145 (1981) the court declared:
In Wellenkamp the lender was a large bank with tremendous strength, resources, and
bargaining power far superior to that of the individual homeowner .... In relative
positions of safety, security, bargaining and ability in an open interest market the
parties are much more equal than in Wellenkamp.... [T]he actual practical effect
upon alienation which would result from enforcement is ... evenly balanced by the
justification for enforcement.
A fourth case involving a non-institutional lender was decided on other grounds. See Guild
Wineries & Distilleries v. Land Dynamics, 103 Cal. App. 3d 968, 163 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1980).
380. Pas v. Hill, 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978) (enforcement denied).
381. See authorities cited in note 376 supra.
382. Id.
383. See, e.g., Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 3d 876, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 572 (1979); Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, - Minn. -, 308
N.W.2d 471 (1981). In Holiday Acres, the court stated:
We do not find the economic concerns which have motivated the courts to hold
that a due-on-sale clause is a restraint on alienation unless it is exercised to protect
the lender's security interest to be as compelling where the loan is used to finance
investment residential property, even though the use of the due-on-sale clause to in-
crease interest rates may restrict the transfer of both borrower-occupied residential
property and investment residential property in the same manner. The need of the
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H. State or Federally Chartered Association
In the same year that Wellenkamp was decided, the Federal
District Court for the Central District of California decided Glen-
dale Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Fox.3 " In Glendale
Federal v. Fox, the court reasoned that the federal regulations"'
promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board had pre-
empted state regulation of the due-on-sale clauses in loan docu-
borrower-occupier for quick and easy transfer of personal residence is greater than
that of the investment borrower. The tension between restraint on alienation princi-
ples and the freedom to contract strikes a different balance when the validity of the
use of a due-on-sale clause to increase interest rates is questioned in a commercial
setting, where economic considerations outweigh all others. This court views the
transaction in an investment setting as one presumably less subject to overreaching,
not because the borrower will in all cases be more sophisticated but because of the
forces compelling the transaction.
_ Minn. at -, 308 N.W.2d at 484.
384. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
385. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) and (g) (1980) reads:
(f) Due-on-sale clauses. An association continues to have the power to include, as a
matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instrument
whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable
sums secured by the association's security instrument if all or any part of the real
property securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the associa-
tions's [sic] prior written consent. Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section
with respect to loans made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occupied or
to be occupied by the borrower, exercise by the association of such option (hereafter
called a due-on-sale clause) shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan
contract, and all rights and remedies of the association and borrower shall be fixed
and governed by that contract.
(g) Limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses. With respect to any loan
made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occupied or to be occupied by the
borrower, a Federal association: (1) Shall not exercise a due-on-sale clause because of
(i) creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the association's security
instrument; (ii) creation of a purchase money security interest for household appli-
ances; (iii) transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint
tenant; or (iv) granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an
option to purchase; (2) shall not impose a prepayment charge or equivalent fee for
acceleration of the loan by exercise of due-on-sale clause; and (3) waives its option to
exercise a due-on-sale clause as to a specific transfer if, before the transfer, the associ-
ation and the person to whom the property is to be sold dr transferred (the existing
borrower's successor in interest) agree in writing that the person's credit is satisfac-
tory to the association and that interest on sums secured by the association's security
interest will be payable at a rate the association shall request. Upon such agreement
and resultant waiver the association shall release the existing borrower from all obli-
gations under the loan instruments, and the association is deemed to have made a
new loan to the existing borrower's successor in interest.
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ments of federally chartered lenders. The result of the conflict be-
tween the Glendale Federal v. Fox and Wellenkamp decisions is
that federal associations operating in California can enforce due-
on-sale clauses while state chartered associations may only enforce
the clause if they are able to demonstrate that their security is
threatened.
The picture is blurred, however, in that Judge Byrne decided not
only Glendale Federal v. Fox, but also People v. Glendale Federal
Savings & Loan Association.8 In People v. Glendale Federal, the
California Attorney General filed an action in state court against
Glendale Federal seeking to enjoin the Association from enforcing
the due-on-sale clause against any borrower. Glendale Federal re-
moved the action to federal court and the Attorney General moved
to remand the case back to state court. Judge Byrne remanded the
action to state court, reasoning that removability of an action filed
in state court is determined solely by the presence of a federal
question in the state court complaint.3 87 Thus, in Glendale Federal
v. Fox, federal law was held to exclusively govern the exercise of a
due-on-sale clause. Simultaneously, the state court, which is not
bound to follow Glendale Federal v. Fox, was invited by the deci-
sion in People v. Glendale Federal to apply state law. 88
Other courts have disagreed with both of Judge Byrne's opin-
ions, thus leaving the law concerning preemption and jurisdiction
even more confused.3 89 In First Federal Savings & Loan v. Lock-
wood,390 the applicability of the preemption doctrine was com-
pletely rejected. The Florida court, seeing that the interpretation
of contracts and foreclosures of mortgages are areas traditionally
left to the equity jurisdiction of the state courts, declared that a
federal lender submits itself to state law equitable restrictions. 91
Thus a federal lender could be required to prove an impairment of
386. 475 F. Supp. 728 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
387. Id. at 731-32.
388. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 298.
389. Bailey v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. Ill. 1979) (jurisdic-
tion question); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (preemption question). But see Dantus v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 502 F.
Supp. 658 (D. Colo. 1980).
390. 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
391. Id. at 159-60.
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its security before it is permitted to exercise the clause.3 92 Schultz
v. Coral Gables Federal Savings & Loan Association,393 although
dealing primarily with the jurisdictional issue, reaffirmed this view:
This [federal] Court is reluctant to inject itself in a case, such as
this, which involves issues traditionally governed by state law and
traditionally and competently dealt with by state judicial tribunals
sitting in equity. It is noteworthy that, in analogous cases involving
predominance of state law and matters intimately connected with
the sovereign power of the state, federal courts have concluded that
abstention is warranted. ... 394
Subsequent litigation has centered along these lines of contro-
versy.3 95 Both federal preemption and the jurisdictional issue will
be examined below.
1. Federal Preemption?
The federal preemption doctrine, which is based on the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,39 applies
when Congress either explicitly or impliedly by creation of legisla-
tion manifests an intent that federal law shall govern to the exclu-
sion of conflicting or inconsistent state law.397 Federally chartered
lenders have argued that the traditional property law of the states
has been usurped by the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933
(HOLA)s9 8 and the FHLBB's subsequent regulations under the
Act.39 9 Lenders claim that, since Board regulations permit the due-
392. "Other Florida decisions have clearly relied on impairment of security as an essential
element of a plaintiff's right to foreclose a mortgage." Id. at 159 n.6.
393. 505 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
394. Id. at 1011.
395. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30.
396. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
397. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732, 736 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
398. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1980).
399. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) and (g) (1980) (formerly 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f) and (g). For
text of regulations see note 385 supra.
19811
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on-sale clause, state law has been preempted and they are entitled
to an absolute and automatic right of enforcement of the clause. 0
There is no express statement in HOLA itself concerning con-
gressional intent with regard to state laws which may address the
same subject matter.4 0 1 The United States Supreme Court has
been hesitant to use the supremacy clause to preempt a state's ex-
ercise of its historic police powers unless the federal act indicates a
clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do so.4 0 2 That Congress
has authority to legislate in this area generally has not been ques-
tioned.40 3 The real question is whether Congress impliedly pre-
empted state law on the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses of
federally chartered associations.
Congressional intent to preempt may be implied in several ways:
[T]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for States to
supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and
the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same pur-
pose. Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the
objective of the federal statute .4 °
Under HOLA Congress clearly intended to create a uniform na-
tionwide system of savings and loans regulated by a central regula-
tory agency-the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The dispute
continues, however, as to which areas or what operations are
reached by preemption.40 5
Courts have acknowledged a greater need for judicial reluctance
to find federal preemption in traditional state matters when pre-
400. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732, 735 (N.D. Fla.
1981). See generally Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30; 11 PAC. L.J. 1085 (1980).
401. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732, 737 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
402. "Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that
Congress did not intend to displace state law." Id. at 736.
403. Id.
404. Id. (citations omitted). See also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947).
405. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 292.
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emption is to be implied.0 6 Consequently, courts take a detailed
look at the subject matter of the law and restrict preemption to the
narrowest possible subject matter.07 Matters involving "internal
affairs"40s-traditionally assumed to be the relationships among di-
rectors, officers, members and associations as well as fiduciary du-
ties of officers and directors and the rights of members to inspect
records-are undisputably within the exclusive domain of the
FHLBB. It is unclear, however, whether Congress intended the is-
sue of the enforceability of the due-on-sale clause to be an activity
which falls outside the field that HOLA was to preempt.4 0 9 Other
association activities have been broadly lumped into a category
identified as "all other activities."'10
For activities where there is no specific regulation dealing with
the disputed activity such as the charging of usurious interest
rates, state law is deemed to control.411 However, preemption may
arise by administrative regulation as well as by statute.4" The
FHLBB passed specific regulations governing due-on-sale clauses
on May 3, 1976.4"' The FHLBB also has maintained that the due-
on-sale clause "is vital and necessary to enable savings and loan
associations to adjust their portfolios towards current market rates,
thereby protecting the associations' financial stability . "... ,4 Al-
though the 1976 regulation does not appear to be retroactive, the
specific wording of the regulation and the pre-regulation Schott 4" 5
advisory opinion indicate that the FHLBB certainly considered the
issue of enforceability as exclusively governed by federal law both
before and after the effective date of the 1976 regulation.
406. 516 F. Supp. at 736.
407. Id.
408. See Meyers v. Beverly Hills Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1974);
11 PAC. L.J. 1085 (1980).
409. 11 PAC. L.J. at 1100-01.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1101.
412. 516 F. Supp. at 737.
413. See note 385 supra for text of the regulations.
414. 516 F. Supp. 732, 738 (quoting FHLBB's Advisory Opinion, Resolution No. 75-647
(July 30, 1975) to the court in Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. CIV-75-366
WMB (C.D. Cal)).
415. Id. For discussion of the cases before and after the issuance of 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-
11(f) and (g), see O'Connell, supra note 15, at 956-61.
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Neither the Board's regulation nor the advisory opinion, how-
ever, has effectively deterred further litigation of the preemption
issue.416 This has resulted not only in the continuing conflict in
California but also in the intriguing dispute posed in Florida by
the Lockwood, Peterson and Schultz cases.417 In its June, 1980 de-
cision in Lockwood, the District Court of Appeals of Florida specif-
ically rejected the preemption argument of the federally chartered
lender and applied Florida law which requires proof by the lender
that there is an impairment of security.418 Conversely, one year
later in First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Peterson,41 9
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Flor-
ida concluded that federal law, embodied in the FHLBB's regula-
tions, impliedly preempted all state law concerning acceleration of
a due-on-sale clause to obtain a higher interest rate from the
purchaser.
It should be noted that the three due-on clauses in Peterson
each plainly stated that acceptance in writing of an interest rate
acceptable to the association might be required before the associa-
tion waived its right to accelerate upon sale by the borrowers. Pe-
terson and Lockwood could perhaps be distinguished on this point.
Nevertheless, the conclusion is inescapable. For a lender to enforce
a due-on-sale clause in state court, he must bear the burden of
showing an impairment to security or enforcement will be denied;
whereas in federal court, a federal lender may automatically en-
force the clause for the sole purpose of raising its interest rates-a
purpose expressly rejected as a legitimate justification for enforce-
ment in the state court. Where federal lenders seek enforcement in
jurisdictions which permit enforcement only upon showing of im-
pairment to security, a race to the courthouse between lender and
consumer appears imminent. 20 Moreover, some mortgagors have
asserted that the choice of law provision in paragraph 15 of the
416. See text accompanying note 386 supra.
417. Compare First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981)
(federal law controls enforceability) with Schultz v. Coral Gables Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
505 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (to consider federal law, a federal question must appear
on the face of the complaint) and First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (state law controls enforceability).
418. 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
419. 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981).
420. 505 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
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FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Mortgage Instrument 421 requires that
where a due-on-sale clause is unenforceable under the law of the
jurisdiction, such law is incorporated into the agreement of the
parties. 422 The essence of this contention is that the parties have
stipulated that state law govern the enforceability of the clause.
The courts split in two 1980 cases which considered this point.423
2. Federal Jurisdiction-A Race to the Courthouse
If the cases of Wellenkamp, Glendale Federal v. Fox, Lockwood,
and Peterson are true indicators of the reception a due-on-sale
clause will receive in the state courts versus the federal courts,
then when a federal lender is involved the single most important
factor to consider is the forum where the issue of enforceability is
to be determined. A race between lenders and consumers is certain
to occur in those jurisdictions where the lender can enforce a due-
on-sale clause only upon demonstrating an impairment to security.
Counsel for the mortgager or purchaser would be well-advised to
begin a state court action for declaratory judgment in order to de-
termine the enforceability of the clause as soon as the sale is cer-
tain. Since purchasers obviously are in position to know of the sale
before the lender gains knowledge of it, they should win the race.
However, counsel for the federal lender may respond to the action
for declaratory judgment with a motion to remove to federal court.
It is here that the courts have struggled with the scope of federal
jurisdiction and the pleadings of the parties.424
Federal courts have general original jurisdiction over cases in-
421. Paragraph 15 provides:
Uniform Mortgage; Governing Law; Severability. This form of mortgage combines
uniform covenants for national use and nonuniform covenants with limited variations
by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real property.
This Mortgage shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property
is located. In the event that any provision of clause of this Mortgage of the Note
conflicts with applicable law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this
Mortgage or the Note which can be given effect without the conflicting provision, and
to this end the provisions of the Mortgage and the Note are declared to be severable.
422. Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 299-300.
423. Kirkland v. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 79-859 (M.D. Fla., May 16, 1980);
Great Western Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Walters, No. C-79-906V (W.D. Wash., June
18, 1980).
424. See, e.g., Schultz v. Coral Gables Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 505 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.
Fla. 1981); Bailey v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. IMI. 1979).
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volving a federal question.425 The difficulty is that the scope of fed-
eral jurisdiction is narrowed by application of a rigid pleading rule
requiring that the federal question must appear on the face of the
complaint.42 As a result, it does not suffice for federal jurisdiction
that the answer raises the federal question.427 The principal issue
now becomes whether the mortgagor, by "artful pleading," can
avoid the federal question and federal preemption defense of the
lender and thus prevent removal to federal court.428 Courts have
split on the issue. Schultz and People v. Glendale Federal fairly
represent the majority view that the federal question must appear
on the face of the complaint.429 Bailey v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Association s0 represents the opposite view. The problem is
made even more intriguing because orders of remand are not re-
viewable on appeal.43 1
The issue of federal preemption continues to be the most crucial
element when enforcement is sought by a federal association. It is
unfortunate that such an important issue is to be resolved by a
425. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 69 (3d ed. 1976).
426. Id.
427. Id. at 69-72. The Schultz court noted:
[T]he federal question of preemption enters this case only by way of defense. Just
as Schultz could not have created federal jurisdiction by anticipating the defense of
federal preemption in his complaint, Coral Gables cannot create removal jurisdiction
by anticipating the defense of federal preemption in its petition for removal or its
answer.
505 F. Supp. at 1009.
428. C. WRIGHT, supra note 425, at 71.
429. Id. at 69.
430. In Bailey, the court stated that:
Normally, the federal question must appear on the face of the complaint, but artful
pleading cannot be used to defeat a defendant's right to remove by concealing the
true nature of the plaintiff's claim. The court may look beyond the "verbiage of the
state complaint" and take judicial notice of federal statutes necessarily brought into
play.
467 F. Supp. at 1141. The court in Schultz dismissed the Bailey decision in its opinion:
The decision in Bailey, although certainly deserving of some measure of deference
from this Court, is subject to criticism on at least two distinct grounds. First, while
ostensibly ruling upon the threshold issue of whether removal was proper, the Court's
decision in Bailey employs language which is tantamount to a decision on the merits
of the case, i.e., state law has been preempted by federal law. This determination was
not only premature; it is, by no means, unequivocally correct. Second, the decision in
Bailey is simply against the weight of authority.
505 F. Supp. at 1009.
431. Dunn & Nowinski, supra note 30, at 299.
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pleading rule. It would be better to have the issue resolved on the
merits of federal preemption rather than on a question of the juris-
diction of the courts. It may be that the regulations of the FHLBB
have gone beyond the scope originally intended by Congress when
it passed the HOLA.45 2 The Senate hearings and communicators
support such a view. ss Other authors have vigorously argued that
blanket preemption by FHLBB is necessary for the full protection
of the federal savings and loan associations. 3 It is an unfortunate
result if state and federal lenders are to be treated differently. In
certain jurisdictions this unseeming race to the courthouse is cer-
tain, and the courts are compelled to guess whose interest public
policy really favors. Judge Aronovitz's words in Schultz, "resolu-
tion lies with Congress not the court,"4 5 should be answered.
I. Non-recourse Financing
Although not solely the decisive factor in any case, it would seem
that courts would be more inclined to allow enforcement if the
purchaser takes the property "subject to" the mortgage lien as op-
posed to an assumption. In the former, the borrower is not person-
ally liable for any deficiency judgment on foreclosure and conse-
quently the risk of waste and default increases.436
The non-recourse nature of the secured obligation between the
lender and the original mortgagor may also influence the courts.
The New Jersey court which denied enforcement to the plaintiff-
lender in Fidelity Land Development Corp. v. Rieder & Sons
432. "Under date of April 13, 1933, President Roosevelt wrote the Congress: 'I ask the
Congress for legislation to protect small homeowners from foreclosure and relieve them of a
portion of the burden of excessive interest and principal payments incurred during the pe-
riod of higher values and higher earning power"' Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v.
Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 19, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
1618, 1702 (1933)).
433. Hearings on Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, H.R. 4980, Before the House Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (Apr. 20, 1933); Hearings on Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933, S. 1317, Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (Apr. 20, 1933). See also 11 PAc. L.J.
1085 (1980).
434. See Dunn & Nowinski, supra not6 30.
435. 505 F. Supp. at 1010.
436. A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 205, 229. Under the stat-
utes or case laws of some jurisdictions, collection of deficiency judgments may be restricted
or illegal. Subcommittee Report, supra note 30, at 918.
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Building & Development Co. 43 7 emphasized the fact that the mort-
gage was non-recourse: "The note and mortgage limited plaintiff's
recourse to the land itself; the principals were under no personal
obligation to plaintiff. Since the transfer was made subject to
plaintiffs mortgage. . . there existed no possibility that its secur-
ity interest . . . would be compromised thereby. '43 8 It has been
suggested that the converse actually may be true-the credit wor-
thiness of the borrower is of greater significance in non-recourse
financing than in many instances where personal liability exists. 3 9
The underwriting of a non-recourse loan may be justified upon the
security itself; however, the borrower's experience and managerial
ability are even more crucial in such loan approvals.4 ° If such is
the case, transfer could pose a substantial threat to the lender's
position.
J. Prepayment Clauses-"Double Risk"
If the mortgage instrument does not contain a prepayment
clause the borrower may be caught in a Catch-22-he can not pre-
pay the debt nor can he sell the property and have the purchaser
assume his obligations.441 This has not proved to be a common
problem, however, in that loan instruments often provide the bor-
rower with the right of prepayment. 42 Often the jurisdiction will
have a statute providing that it is unlawful to extract prepayment
penalties upon acceleration by the lender under a due-on-sale
clause. 44 The potential for a problem, nevertheless, remains as
437. 151 N.J. Super. 502, 377 A.2d 691 (1977).
438. Id. at -, 377 A.2d at 695.
439. Subcommittee Report, supra note 30, at 918.
440. Id.
441. Rogers v. Williamsburgh Sav. Bank, 79 Misc. 2d 852, 361 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1974). The
lender refused to consent to a transfer subject to the existing mortgage or alternatively that
the balance of the principal due be paid upon lender's waiver of the prepayment fee. The
court retroactively applied a New York statute which precluded prepayment penalties upon
failure of the lender to consent to transfer (mortgage executed October 27, 1971; statute
effective May 29, 1972; sale by borrower January, 1974). See also Terry v. Born, 24 Wash.
App. 652, 604 P.2d 504 (1979); A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at
105-12.
442. See, e.g., Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580, 582
(1976).
443. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10242.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 36-9g(c) (1981); MIcH. Compw. LAWS § 438.31(c) (1981); Mo. REv. STAT. §
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prepayment is frequently restricted in the first few years of the
mortgage term or is conditioned upon the payment of a penalty-a
percentage of the unpaid balance.444
On the other hand, lenders have contended that if the lender is
restricted in the exercise of the due-on clause and the mortgage
instrument gives the borrower the right to prepay, the lender is
exposed to a "double risk.' 45 Borrowers can take advantage of a
decrease in interest rates by refinancing, while lenders are denied
the opportunity to renegotiate upon sale as interest rates climb.
This rationale has been attacked by some as unrealistic consider-
ing the inherent inertia and lack of sophistication of the average
home owner/mortgagor. 44 In Crockett v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Association,"7 the most frequently cited authority for the
"double risk," the lender sought to increase the interest rate from
7 to 9 %. Given the recent 20% interest rates, arguments citing
Crockett as precedent have a particularly hollow ring in equity and
are not likely to be the key factor in current disputes."8
K. Unimproved Land
Courts continue to be influenced by the nature of the security.449
Although the fact that the security was unimproved land has not
been seen as the key factor in any due-on decision, it nevertheless
has received considerable attention."50 There is a reduced risk of
waste when the land is unimproved, and it seems somewhat un-
408.036 (Cum. Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-2 (1979); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 254-
a (McKinney's Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1321.58 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-
330.27:1 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
444. A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 110.
445. See O'Connell, supra note 15, at 938, 944.
446. Id. at 944.
447. 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
448. In the Amicus Curiae brief filed on behalf of Virginia Savings and Loan League in
Lipps v. First Am. Sero. Corp., which is now on appeal before the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, the court is asked to adopt the "double risk" rationale of Crockett.
449. See Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. Land Dynamics, 103 Cal. App. 3d 968, -, 163
Cal. Rptr. 348, 354 (1980), where the court found circumstances to establish that there was
no unreasonable restraint on alienation: "[T]he wine cooperage which is the major asset
securing the debt is in its nature subject to removal and to deterioration if it is misused or
neglected."
450. See, e.g., Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293
N.W.2d 843 (1980).
1981]
104 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:35
realistic to expect a borrower to maintain the land in an unim-
proved urban state to the end of the term of the standard
mortgage.451
L. Antitrust
Lending institutions which originate mortgage loans for subse-
quent resale to the Federal National Mortgage Association or the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation are required to use uni-
form mortgage documents and follow standards prescribed by
these institutions.5 2 Even state chartered associations are inti-
mately related to the FNMA, FHLMC and FHLBB, as certain re-
451. See Fidelity Land Dev. Corp. v. Rieder & Sons Bldg. & Dev. Co., 151 N.J. Super.
502, -, 377 A.2d 691, 695 (1977): "The land in question being undeveloped could not be
subjected to depreciation for lack of care in maintenance .... Plaintiff's recourse to this
tract of undeveloped land in satisfaction of defendant's debt remained unimpaired by the
transfer. . . ."; Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, -, 293
N.W.2d 843, 846 (1980): "It is not realistic to argue that the owner here intended the mort-
gage to remain in effect for the entire mortgage term, nor is it realistic to argue that the
lender could not reasonably expect the mortgage to be prepaid well in advance of its due
date."
452. See 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (b)(2) (1976); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et. seq. (1976). Neither Fannie
Mae (FNMA) nor Freddie Mac (FHLMC) will purchase a conventional mortgage originated
after January 1, 1976 unless the Uniform Mortgage Instrument form is used. U.S. DRP'T OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SURVEY OF MORTGAGE LENDING AcTIVTrY, Rpt. No. 80-
298 (1980).
The Federal National Mortgage Association, .... Fannie Mae, as the corporation is
often called.., a private corporation owned by its shareholders.., is the largest
single provider of funds for housing in the United States. Approximately 3,500 lend-
ers across the country-mainly mortgage companies, savings and loan associations,
commercial banks, and credit unions-are approved to sell mortgages to Fannie Mae.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, FANNIE MAE, AMERICA'S MORTGAGE RESOURCE
Pub. 64 (Aug. 1980).
Substantially all of the $22.4 billion in conventional mortgages which have been pur-
chased by the FHLMC were originated using the FNMA/FHLMC standard instruments.
Similarly, substantially all of the $16.2 billion in conventional mortgages owned by the
FNMA as of December 31, 1979 were originated on the FNMA/FHLMC instruments.
FHLMC estimates that approximately 80% of all conventional mortgages currently being
originated are originated on the FNMA/FHLMC instruments. Conventional single family
mortgage originations by savings and loan associations for the first six months of 1980 alone
aggregated $21.7 billion. U.S. DEm'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, SURVEY OF
MORTGAGE LENDING AcTIvITy, Rpt. No. 80-298 (1980). See also Consolidated Farmers Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Anchor Sav. Ass'n, 480 F. Supp. 640 (D. Kan. 1979) (FNMA and FHLMC re-
quired standards that hazard insurance be provided by a company with at least a class VI
rating in BEST'S INSURANCE REPORTS as condition for acceptance of mortgages). FNMA re-
quires a "call" provision in lieu of a due-on-sale clause in 17 states.
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quirements are placed on any lender intending to participate in the
secondary mortgage market operated by these institutions.53
The required use of uniform contractual documents and the op-
erational regulations imposed on lenders operating in the secon-
dary market may constitute concerted action to restrain trade in
violation of federal and state antitrust laws. 4  Although it is cer-
tain that these regulations have the effect of forcing uniformity,
the few challenges to regulations prescribed by FNMA and
FHLMC have enjoyed little success in the courts.455 The primary
obstacle to the success of such a challenge has been proving the
required concerted action on the part of the lenders.456 Rather, the
uniform regulations have forced the uniform activity. FHLMC has
plead successfully statutory immunity while other defendants have
espoused statutory exemption. 57 The Virginia antitrust act, for ex-
ample, excludes conduct by certain administrative agencies, state
or federal. 58 The propriety of exempting FNMA under such a stat-
ute could possibly be challenged since FNMA operates as a private
453. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp. 307, 308 (E.D. Va. 1980)
(state chartered savings and loan association subject to court's jurisdiction by virtue of its
"membership in the Federal Home Loan Bank, the insurance of its accounts by the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and its eligibility to sell residential mortgages to
the FHLMC."). See also Consolidated Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Say. Ass'n, 480 F.
Supp. 640, 644 (D. Kan. 1979).
454. See Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F. 2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981); Consoli-
dated Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anchor Say. Ass'n, 480 F. Supp. 640 (D. Kan. 1979) (anti-
trust action brought under Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1976) challenging FNMA's and
FHLMC's requirements for hazard insurance on secured properties as condition for accept-
ances of mortgages). The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) reads, in pertinent part- "Every
contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. .. ."
455. See notes 454 supra and 459 infra.
456. 480 F. Supp. at 648: "In order to prevail on a § 1 [15 U.S.C.] claim a plaintiff must
show (1) concerted action, and (2) an unreasonable restraint of trade."
457. Id. at 644.
458. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.4(b) (Cure. Supp. 1981) provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall make unlawful conduct that is authorized,
regulated or approved (1) by a state, or (2) by an administrative or constitutionally
established agency of this State or of the United States having jurisdiction of the
subject matter and having authority to consider the anticompetitive [sic] effect, if
any, of such conduct. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to alter or termi-
nate any other applicable limitation, exemption or exclusion.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:35
corporation through the sale of stock in the private sector.459 The
antitrust challenge has not been extensively explored in any due-
on-sale case to date and remains subject to development.
VI. CONCLUSION
As variable rate mortgages and other alternative mortgage de-
vices gain popularity, some of the tension between lender, bor-
rower and purchaser will subside.4 60 However, these new financing
devices will not eliminate the problems posed by due-on clauses.
First, the problem of the fixed-rate mortgages executed prior to
the advent of the variable rate mortgage will have to be addressed.
It will take years before lenders are able to completely shift their
portfolios. Secondly, the typical homebuyer is fearful of these new
complicated financing techniques. As a result, the young couple
buying a home borrows substantially all of the purchase price. 61
Their purpose is not investment, but the acquisition of a residence.
They like the idea of "knowing" what their monthly payments are
459. In Williams, the Fourth Circuit noted that a state-chartered lender was "intimately
related to activities of FNMA, FHLMC and the FHLBB," and concluded that the lender's
conduct in use of the due-on-sale clause was exempt as FHLMC had authority to address
the anti-competitive effect of due-on-sale clauses. 651 F.2d at 930. The antitrust action in
Williams was brought under the Virginia antitrust law, which mirrors the federal act. See
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.5 (Cum. Supp. 1981), which makes unlawful "[e]very contract, com-
bination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce. ... " 
The Fourth Circuit rejected the borrower's contention that VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.34,
which calls for prominent display of a notice of the presence of a due-on-sale clause in the
mortgage, is not an approval of the clause: "[T]he manifestly broader coverage of 'author-
ized, regulated or approved' suffices to insulate due-on clauses from the Virginia antitrust
law, at any rate when considered solely in and of themselves and not in connection with
other activities." 651 F.2d at 931. The Fourth Circuit also found: "In the first place, there is
no evidence of any kind to suggest that adoption of the due-on-sale clause by the lenders to
the Potes [borrowers in one of the four consolidated cases in the Williams opinion] pro-
ceeded from a conspiracy or other combination." Id. at 924.
460. The term "adjustable-rate mortgage" is used broadly to describe all of several types
of variable interest rate mortgages. Fannie Mae has approved eight basic types as of Aug. 7,
1981. Washington Post, June 26, 1981, at Al, col. 1. The types differ in the manner in which
the increase in debt service due to the interest rate increase is to be paid, the time period
over which adjustments are to be made, and the index used to reflect the change in interest
rate. See Browne, Alternate Mortgage Instruments, MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE
INSTRUMENTS 437 (PLI Feb. - Apr. 1981).
461. Because of leverage, the seasoned investor also ordinarily wants to borrow as much
as possible. See A. AXELROD, C. BERGER, & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra note 6, at 275-329 (tax
considerations of the transaction).
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and what they are going to be.46 2 Conventional fixed-rate mort-
gages provide them with their only real foothold against the tide of
runaway inflation.
Yet, lenders can not be expected to do business as usual. Lend-
ers must have a means of maintaining a positive point spread be-
tween monies loaned and monies deposited or borrowed.
Drafting the security instrument in a manner which would
clearly advise the mortgagor of the conditions for exercising the
clause would alleviate much of the problem in future loans. With
existing mortgages the courts will be asked to strike a balance be-
tween restraint on alienation and the freedom to contract. Contin-
ued controversy over the issue of federal preemption is certain.
There are no quick solutions on the horizon." 3 For the present,
the economic triangle of lender, borrower and purchaser will pass
their sour marriage before the court.
0
462. See notes 6 & 460 supra.
463. Even if legislation were passed, the problem of applying it retroactively to pre-ex-
isting mortgages remains. But see Rogers v. Williamsburgh Sav. Bank, 79 Misc. 2d 852, 361
N.Y.S.2d 531 (1974).
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ADDENDUM
At the heart of much of the discussion in this article has been
the question of whether the acceleration of the maturity of a loan
by a lender on transfer of the security, absent a showing of impair-
ment to the security, constitutes an unreasonable restraint on
alienation. Just before the presses were scheduled to roll on this
issue of the University of Richmond Law Review, the Supreme
Court of Virginia answered no. The purpose in this limited space is
not to criticize the two decisions in which the court reached this
conclusion,1 although criticism surely and justly will come. The
goal here is to update this article's earlier discussion of Virginia
law.2 Since the facts and arguments of counsel of the two cases
involved are comprehensively detailed in that earlier section, the
present discussion will be devoted principally to explaining or rec-
onciling the decisions of Lipps v. First American Service Corp.3
and United Virginia Bank v. Best" with the conclusions in this
article.
Albert and Judith Lipps borrowed $31,500 from First American
Savings and Loan with interest at the rate of 9 /% per annum.
They executed a deed of trust to secure the loan. The deed of trust
document was the standard FNMA/FHLMC uniform mortgage
document containing paragraph number 17,5 which reads as fol-
lows: "If all or any part of the Property or an interest therein is
sold or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written
consent. . .Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums
secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due and paya-
ble."6 Mr. and Mrs. Lipps entered into a land contract with
Sandmar Associates, Inc., as purchaser. A general warranty deed
was placed in escrow until payment was made by the purchaser of
the remaining balance of $30,986.97 due on the note. Upon learn-
ing of the land contract, the lender demanded that purchaser pay a
1. Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982); United Va.
Bank v. Best, No. 790777 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982).
2. See text accompanying notes 209-76 supra.
3. Opinion, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982).
4. Opinion, United Va. Bank v. Best, No. 790777 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982).
5. See note 24 supra. See also text accompanying notes 333-61 supra.
6. Opinion at 1, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982).
See note 24 supra.
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2% assumption fee and allow the interest rate to be increased to
13 %. When the purchaser refused the lender's demand, the
lender began foreclosure proceedings.
In the Lipps decision, the court faced three questions: Does par-
agraph 17 of the FNMA/FHLMC uniform mortgage instrument
constitute an invalid restraint on alienation? Is impairment to the
lender's security a condition to enforcement of the due-on-sale
provision of paragraph 17T Does transfer of the security by land
contract constitute a transfer under the provision of the due-on-
sale clause? s The court resolved all three questions in favor of the
lender.
The court began by determining when a restraint such as a re-
straint on alienation will be a reasonable one and defined the "rea-
sonableness" of restraint in the context of Hercules Powder Co. v.
Continental Can Co.:9
The reasonableness of a restraint on the use of property "is to be
determined by considering whether it is such only as to afford a fair
protection to the interest of the party in favor of whom it is given,
and not so large as to interfere with the interest of the public."' 0
After an analysis of the language of paragraph 17, the court
concluded "that enforcement of the covenant does not defeat or
forfeit the estate conveyed. The transaction does not affect the
quantity or quality of the conveyance between Borrowers and Pur-
chaser. Its effect is confined to the acceleration of the due date of
the indebtedness."11
In support of its conclusion that paragraph 17 is not an unrea-
sonable restraint, the court viewed paragraph 17 as "sanctioned as
part of the public policy of the Commonwealth" and validated by
the law of Virginia.12 In reaching this result the court quoted Wal-
7. See text accompanying notes 344-75 supra.
8. See text accompanying notes 277-332 supra.
9. 196 Va. 935, 86 S.E.2d 128 (1955).
10. Opinion at 3, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982)
(quoting Hercules Powder Co. v. Continental Can Co., 196 Va. 935, 940, 86 S.E.2d 128, 131
(1955)).
11. Opinion at 4, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982).
12. Id. at 6.
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lihan v. Hughes:13
The law looks with favor upon the making of contracts between
competent parties upon valid consideration and for lawful purposes.
Public policy has its place in the law of contracts,-yet that will-o'-
the-wisp of the law varies and changes with the interests, habits,
need, sentiments and fashions of the day, and courts are averse to
holding contracts unenforceable on the ground of public policy un-
less their illegality is clear and certain.14
Section 55-59 of the Virginia Code15 was deemed by the court to
require that a general acceleration clause is to be read into every
deed of trust in Virginia and that the clause may be triggered upon
"the breach of any of the covenants entered into or imposed upon
the grantor. ... 6Additionally the court reviewed the legislative
history of section 6.1-330.34 of the Virginia Code, 17 wherein the
"General Assembly, instead of prohibiting acceleration upon sale
or transfer,""8 chose rather to provide for notice if a deed of trust
is to contain such a clause. Citing Williams v. First Federal Sav-
ings & Loan,' the court unfortunately concluded that if the due-
on-sale provision is "a restraint on alienation, it is one validated by
Virginia law as an inescapable conclusion from this statutory
enactment."2 0
The second issue in the Lipps case-whether impairment of the
lender's security is a condition to enforcement of the due-on-sale
clause-was dismissed by the court in a single paragraph. In re-
jecting borrowers' and purchasers' contention that a condition to
the above effect must be implied into the clause, the court cited
White v. Commonwealth" and Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louis-
13. 196 Va. 117, 82 S.E.2d 553 (1954).
14. Opinion at 5, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982)
(quoting Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 125, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (1954)).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59 (Repl. Vol. 1981).
16. Opinion at 5, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982)
(quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59 (Repl. Vol. 1981)).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.34 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
18. Opinion at 6, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982).
19. 651 F.2d 910, 923-34 (4th Cir. 1981). See text accompanying notes 209-76 supra.
20. Opinion at 6, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982).
21. 158 Va. 749, 164 S.E. 375 (1932).
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ville & N.R.R.:22
While the court, in construing a contract, may take into view the
circumstances under which it was made, yet when a breach of it is
averred its language must determine to what the parties to it bound
themselves. Courts are not authorized to make contracts for them or
to add to any stipulation which they have not seen proper to
insert.2 3
In deciding the final issue of the case, whether a land contract
constitutes a transfer so as to trigger the due-on-sale clause, the
court considered the equitable interest transferred to the pur-
chaser under the doctrine of equitable conversion as sufficient to
activate paragraph 17.24 The federal issues2 5 were not discussed, as
the court believed it was unnecessary since the validity of para-
graph 17 was established under state law.28
In the companion case of United Virginia Bank v. Best,27 the
court reversed the circuit court which had found that the due-on-
sale provision in the deed of trust constituted an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation absent a showing that enforcement was neces-
sary to protect the lender's security interest. Edward and Anna
Firth borrowed $66,800 from United Virginia Bank in August,
1972, and executed a deed of trust to secure this amount to the
bank. In March, 1978, Stephen and Letty Best signed a contract to
purchase the secured property. Upon notice to the bank of the in-
tended sale, the bank demanded a 1% assumption fee and an in-
crease in the interest rate of 13 %. The Bests refused the bank's
demand, and the property was transferred to the purchasers by
22. 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551 (1906).
23. Opinion at 6, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982)
(quoting Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 106 Va. 223, 226-27, 55 S.E. 551,
552 (1906)).
24. Opinion at 7, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982)
(quoting Sale v. Swann, 138 Va. 198, 208, 120 S.E. 870, 873 (1924)).
25. See text accompanying notes 384-435 supra. By sidestepping the federal issues, the
court has avoided a troublesome quagmire, but it has also swept away any possible antitrust
challenges similar to those which were successful in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n,
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
26. Opinion at 7-8, Lipps v. First Am. Serv. Corp., No. 800908 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22,
1982).
27. United Va. Bank v. Best, No. 790777 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982).
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deed. The lender then notified the Firths that it was accelerating
the note.
The provisions of the deed of trust differed from those of the
federal boilerplate deed of trust involved in the Lipps decision.
The deed of trust in Best contained the language:
And the said parties of the first part, in order more fully to pro-
tect the security of this Deed of Trust, do hereby agree as follows:
7. The maker of the note covenants and agrees that he will not
assign or transfer the property secured by this deed of trust without
prior approval of the noteholder.2 8
The Supreme Court of Virginia construed the phrase, "in order
more fully to protect the security of this Deed of Trust," as a pref-
atory clause "a preamble, a recital, or a purpose clause. '29 As such
the court concluded that if a prefatory clause conflicts with the
obligatory provisions of the contract, the obligatory provisions
prevail.30
The court expressed its concern that if the clause were construed
as requiring impairment of security before a lender could exercise
acceleration, lenders would be compelled to show that its risk in
the obligation had increased on a case by case basis.3 1
[B]efore a lender could avail itself of the use of the acceleration
clause, it would be compelled to show that its security had been
impaired or its risk in the obligation increased. If this were true,
lenders in each and every case, as a practical matter, would have to
resort to litigation to activate an acceleration clause because impair-
ment of security or increase of risk would entail factual-value judg-
ments which only a court could provide. We do not believe this re-
sult was contemplated in the execution of the deed of trust.3 2
28. Opinion at 1, United Va. Bank v. Best, No. 790777 (Va. Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1982) (em-
phasis added by the court).
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2-3.
32. Id. at 3. But see Baker v. Loves Park Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1
(1975) and text accompanying notes 305-32 supra.
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The conclusions reached by the Virginia Supreme Court in these
two brief but sweeping decisions clearly and unequivocally place
the Commonwealth in the pro-lender column. In refusing to distin-
guish the two cases on their facts and in refusing to consider the
quantum of restraint as weighed against the purpose for accelera-
tion, the court has adopted for Virginia a blanket endorsement for
the enforcement of the due-on-sale clause.
Just given the Lipps opinion, one could have argued that the
court approached the security documents with an eye toward strict
interpretation by refusing to read into the deed of trust in Lipps
the necessity for showing impairment to security as a condition for
enforcement. Yet, by sweeping aside the statement of purpose
clause in the deed of trust in Best upon the premise that it was a
prefatory clause conflicting with an obligatory provision, the court
ignored another equally well-founded principle of contract
law-that the document should be construed based on the parties'
intention as ascertained from the four corners of the document.33
In falling to consider the possible inequity of the situation (the
unequal bargaining positions and relative ignorance of the residen-
tial borrower;3 4 the severity of restraint in a land contract sale;3 5
and the possible penalty or unconscionability issues"), the court
has opened the door to the exercise of the clause in a host of other
lender-consumer conflicts. If the court genuinely believes, as it
states, that any transfer of a legal or an equitable interest permits
acceleration by the lender, homeowners have a number of situa-
tions to fear:
(1) leasing an above-garage apartment or taking in a boarder;37
(2) adding a sun porch or room to the house and executing a
second mortgage;8
(3) the widening of a street by the city in front of the house
which results in the conveyance of a one foot strip of land relative
33. See, e.g., Camp v. Camp, 220 Va. 595, 260 S.E.2d 243 (1979).
34. See text accompanying notes 362-75 and 381-83 supra. See also Holiday Acres No. 3
v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981).
35. See text accompanying notes 333-61 supra.
36. See text accompanying notes 362-75 and 441-48 supra.
37. See text accompanying notes 277-304 supra.
38. Id. See, e.g., La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
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to eminent domain action; 9
(4) executing a deed to VEPCO, a telephone company, or a cable
television company which requires an easement across the secured
property;40
(5) taking an extended summer vacation and leasing the home
for that time.4'
Because of the court's sweeping endorsement of the due-on-sale
clause in Lipps and Best, the court can be expected to perceive
these transactions as transfers and to favor a lender's acceleration.
At the very best, its sweeping endorsement of the clause may be
enough to deter further challenge by consumers. The court never
mentioned the need for portfolio adjustment by the lender in its
opinions, but under the court's blanket endorsement of the due-
on-sale clause the lender need not give any justification for en-
forcement. To those who would describe the above discussion as a
reduction to the absurd, recall that a few years ago lenders chose
not to exercise due-on-sale clauses even in an outright sale.
Because of the court's reliance upon section 6.1-330.34 of the
Virginia Code for support of its endorsement of the due-on-sale
clause, one might anticipate a revival of legislation similar to
House Bill 601 of the 1974 General Assembly.42 The presence of
the strong banking lobby makes such a result seem doubtful. The
court gave no significance to the retroactivity of current legislation
to those mortgages executed before its effective date. Borrowers
who executed deeds of trust in an era when lenders chose not to
exercise the clause may find their intent altered by this current
judicial and legislative endorsement of the clause.
The final chapter of this conflict, however, has not been written.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently granted certio-
rari to hear the federal preemption and jurisdiction issues.4" For
39. Involuntary conveyance has also been claimed by lenders to activate the clause. See,
e.g., Medovoi v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 3d 244, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1979).
See also text accompanying notes 227-304 supra.
40. See text accompanying notes 227-304 supra.
41. Id.
42. See text accompanying note 260 supra.
43. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr.
467 (1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3585 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1982) (No. 81-750).
The questions presented to the United States Supreme Court are the following: (1) Is the
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the present, lenders in Virginia, like those in Nebraska after the
state law of California, which prohibits the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses as unreasona-
ble restraints on alienation, preempted by the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 and Federal
Home Loan Bank Board regulations promulgated thereunder? (See text accompanying
notes 384-435 supra.) (2) Does the "law of jurisdiction" clause (see paragraph 15 of the
FNMA/FHLMC uniform mortgage instrument at note 421 supra and text accompanying
notes 384-88 supra) in the mortgage loan contract prevent Federal Home Loan Bank Board
regulations from governing due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loan associations?
An equally intriguing issue is whether a state chartered association is subject to federal
jurisdiction by virtue of its membership in the Federal Home Loan Bank, the insurance of
its accounts by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and its eligibility to
sell residential mortgages to FHLMC. See, e.g., Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
500 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Va. 1980).
In the de la Cuesta decision three cases were consolidated by the trial court. Purchasers
of property encumbered by deeds of trust in the three cases-de la Cuesta, Moore and
Whitcombe-each brought actions for declaratory and injuntive relief against a federally
chartered savings and loan association against the threatened foreclosure following the pur-
ported exercise of the deed of trust's due-on-sale clause. The trial court granted the defen-
dant savings and loan association's motion for summary judgment on the ground that appli-
cation of state law was precluded by federal preemption. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal of California reversed in each of the three cases. After a comprehensive discussion of
the various methods in which federal preemption arises, the court deemed state law to con-
trol and as such enforcement of the due-on-sale clause was barred as an unreasonable re-
straint on alienation. In the Moore and Whitcombe cases the deeds of trust were the stan-
dard FNMA/FHLMC uniform mortgage instrument which contained in paragraph 15:
"[This form of deed of trust combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform
covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction . . .. ] This Deed of Trust shall be gov-
erned by the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located." (175 Cal. Rptr. at
475) (emphasis added by the court). In the de la Cuesta case the deed of trust instrument
was executed many years prior to FHLBB's promulgation of its due-on-sale regulation of
June 8, 1976. See text accompanying notes 384-435 supra. Further, the deed of trust secured
alleged commercial property. Although the provisions of paragraph 15 (the FNMA/FHLMC
uniform mortgage instrument as modified for use in California) were not present in the de
la Cuesta deed of trust as they were in the Moore and Whitcombe deeds of trust, the court
concluded that application of state law was not preempted and denied enforcement of the
due-on-sale clause:
We recognize that the deed of trust here involved does not contain a provision such
as that found in the other two deeds of trust to the effect that it shall be governed by
the law of the jurisdiction in which the property is situated. However, our conclusion
in the Moore case was not based so much on an agreement between the parties for
the application of state law as on the conclusion that the general use of a provision
containing such language by federal savings and loan associations with the approval
of the Board persuasively evidences a recognition by the Board and federal savings
and loan associations that state law would govern the interpretation, validity and
enforcement of security instruments. Thus, the absence of the special provision in the
particular trust deed, here, is of no great significance to our resolution of the preemp-
tion issue.
175 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
The court further was unmoved by the savings and loan association's claim that the com-
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Occidental44 decision, have much cause to rejoice for this wholesale
victory.
mercial nature of the secured property prompted a different result. The court accordingly
forbade the exercise of the due-on-sale clauses in the absence of any threat of impairment to
the security or any increased risk of default.
44. Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980). See
text accompanying notes 164-66 supra.
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